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The Bodily Attitudinal Theory of Emotions 
by 
Chan Chun Nam Emile 
Master of Philosophy 
Section 1 of this thesis investigates one issue in meta-ethics, namely, the nature of 
moral judgments. What are moral judgments? What does it mean by "wrong" when we 
assert "Killing is wrong?" Neo-sentimentalism is a meta-ethical theory which holds that the 
judgment that killing wrong is the judgment that it is appropriate to have a particular 
negative emotion towards the action. In other words, to judge that murder is wrong is to 
judge that we have a right reason for having a negative emotion towards the behavior. In the 
framework of neo-sentimentalism, the concepts of wrongness consist of negative emotions. 
If the moral judgment is the judgment that it is appropriate to have a negative 
emotion towards the action, and the concept of wrongness contains a negative emotion, 
then the following question is what emotions are. In section 2, I endorse the bodily 
attitudinal theory of emotions, a view which holds that a conscious physiological reaction 
which induces behavior disposition and the change of facial expression and internal organs is 
necessary for having an emotion. This section also articulates and replies to three major 
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0 Overview of the thesis 
 This thesis investigates an issue in meta-ethics, namely, the nature of moral 
judgments. Before giving an answer to this issue, it would be better to explain what meta-
ethics is. Fisher (2011, 11) mentions an analogy to distinguish between applied ethics, 
normative ethics, and meta-ethics. Imagine that studying ethics is just like playing football. 
In the game, there are three groups of people, including players, referees, and analysts. 
Applied ethics are like players, who reflect that whether their actions violate the given rules. 
They study in issues like if it is morally wrong to have an abortion and whether it is morally 
required to give money to charity according to the given moral norms. Normative ethicists 
are like referees, who interpret the rules that govern the game. They investigate on 
questions like whether consequences matter to decide the moral status of having an 
abortion or giving money to charity. Meta-ethics are like analysts, who attempt to 
understand how the football game goes on. They explore questions like what it means by 
“morally praiseworthy” and “morally blameworthy” and so forth, how to know what is right 
and what is wrong, and how to be motivated to act morally. 
As I have briefly distinguished between applied ethics, normative ethics, and meta-
ethics, it is time to ask what the nature of moral judgments is. In this thesis, I attempt to 
propose moral sentimentalism, briefly, a view which holds that emotions are necessary for 
moral judgments. The sentimentalist theory possesses some advantages. For example, it 
explains why moral judgments are motivating because emotions are motivating and 
indispensable to moral judgments. Also, our daily experience tells us that most of the time 
we will feel anger when we judge that one has acted morally wrong, or we will feel guilt 
when we judge that we have done something immoral. 
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Historically, David Hume was one of the pioneers who proposed moral sentimentalism, 
a view that moral judgments depend on the feeling of sentient beings. As in his work An 
Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, David Hume writes: 
The final sentence, it is probable, which pronounces characters and actions amiable or 
odious, praise-worthy or blameable; that which renders morality and active principle, 
and constitutes virtue our happiness, and vice our misery; It is probable, I say, that this 
final sentence depends on some internal sense of feeling, which nature has made 
universal in the whole species. (Beauchamp ed., 1998, 5)  
 
Such feeling of sentient beings is what Hume called sympathy which we refer to as empathy 
nowadays (Slote, 2010, 5). Following Hume’s sprit, Slote develops a particular version of 
moral sentimentalism. Slote (2010, 63; Watson, 2011 143) understands moral judgments as 
moral approvals (or disapprovals) that are analyzed in terms of the feelings of being 
warmed (or being chilled) by one’s empathy towards others’ pain or needs.   
However, sometimes we still judge an action as morally wrong while being warmed by 
one’s empathy towards another person (Watson, 2011, 143). It leads us to believe that it is 
needed to have a less specific version of moral sentimentalism in order to avoid the 
counter-example that Slote’s sentimentalism suffers from. A simpler version of moral 
sentimentalism is proposed by Jesse Prinz. As he writes: 
The theory I have in mind is not new. It’s a variant of an old theme, associated with 
the British moralists, especially Hume. Simply, the theory says: To believe that 
something is morally wrong (right) is to have a sentiment of disapprobation 
(appropriation) towards it. (Prinz, 2006, 33) 
 
Prinz’s sentimentalism is similar to D’Arms and Jacobson’s (2000, 724) sentimentalist 
account which holds that “the judgment that an action X is wrong with disapproval of X 
(and would similarly identify rightness with approval).” 
 Prinz’s theory takes negative sentiments in general, instead of empathy specifically, 
as what are necessary to moral judgments, and thus avoid the counter-examples to Slote’s 
sentimentalism. Yet such simple form of moral sentimentalism faces a direct objection, 
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namely, the problem of the recalcitrance of emotions. Sometimes we judge that an action 
has a negative value without having a negative sentiment towards the action, or we have a 
negative sentiment towards the action without judging the action as having the negative 
value (D’arms and Jacobson, 2000, 725). It is needed to modify the simple form of moral 
sentimentalism to overcome this objection. 
 The next question is how to modify the simple sentimentalism. By looking back to 
what Hume writes, a glue can be found: 
But in order to pave the way for such a sentiment, and give a proper discernment of 
its object, it is often necessary, we find, that much reasoning should precede, that nice 
distinctions be made, just conclusions drawn, distant comparisons formed, 
complicated relations examined, and general facts fixed and ascertained. (Beauchamp 
ed., 1998, 5) 
 
As D’Arms and Jacobson (2000, 723) also suggest, “hence, philosophers who take 
inspiration from Hume must allow reasoning, as well as feeling, to play a role in evaluative 
judgment. The central challenge for sentimentalism is to preserve the idea that values are 
somehow grounded in the sentiments, while at the same time making sense of the rational 
aspects of evaluation.” On the basis of what Hume and D’Arms and Jacobson mention, it is 
natural and legitimate to add reason into the sentimentalist framework to avoid the 
problem that the simple sentimentalism suffers from. 
Neo-sentimentalism is a theory that unifies emotions and reason, as Sauer writes: 
To judge an action A to have some evaluative property P (goodness, badness, 
rightness, wrongness…) is to judge it appropriate (warranted, justified…) to have an 
associated emotional response (guilt, resentment, contempt…) towards A.  (Sauer, 
2011, 111) 
 
It is said that to judge that an action is morally wrong is to judge that it is appropriate to 
have a negative sentiment, such as anger, towards the action. But it does not mean that the 
judgment of an appropriate emotion towards the action is actually accompanied by a 
negative emotion. Otherwise, neo-sentimentalism cannot be immune to the problem of 
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recalcitrant of emotions. Because it is obvious that one can judge that it is appropriate to 
have a negative emotion without having the emotions actually. 
 Nevertheless, once we understand moral judgments as the judgments of 
appropriate emotions without actually having the emotions, what is the importance of 
emotions? It seems that emotions no longer a play crucial in the picture. To preserve the 
importance of emotions, I introduce the dual-process theory of mind. The theory holds that 
the mind is divided into two systems, namely, system 1 and system 2. System1 is 
responsible for automatic and instinctive processes that do not need to be consciously 
accessed and are cognitively economical, whereas system 2 is responsible for rational and 
deliberative processes that require conscious attentions and are cognitive-resources 
demanding. I shall argue that emotions belong to system 1 and thus one makes moral 
evaluations cognitively economical. In addition, emotions make one sensitive to the values 
of the objects in environments and motivate one to act according to the moral judgment. 
Without the help of emotions, one cannot be motivated to act morally.  
 Since emotions have such importance, I need to introduce a theory of emotions to 
illustrate their significance. We need an account of emotions that illuminates how emotions 
make one aware of the value of objects, able to make implicit moral evaluations, and 
motivated to act morally. James’s theory of emotions was once influential. His theory holds 
that the changes of the internal bodily feelings are emotions themselves. As James writes:  
My thesis, on the contrary, is that the bodily changes follow directly the perception of 
the exciting fact and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur is the emotion. 
James (1884, 189) 
 
Nonetheless, understand emotions as what James suggests leads us to a serious flaw. Our 
ordinary speaking of emotions demonstrates that emotions are intentional, which means 
that emotions are directed at objects in the world. For instance, “Sam is sad for his cat, and 
“Mary is angry at the man” and so forth. If emotions are merely the feelings of the internal 
 5 
 
bodily changes, then James’s theory cannot explain the intentionality of emotions. And as 
James’s theory cannot capture the intentionality, his theory cannot demonstrate how 
emotions make one sensitive to the values of objects. The theory only makes one aware of 
the feelings of one’s internal bodily changes.  
 The bodily attitudinal theory of emotions can be considered as a descendant of 
James’s theory. Yet unlike its ascendant, the bodily attitudinal theory not only captures the 
phenomenology but also the intentionality of emotions, as the following is its central thesis: 
Each emotion consists in a specific felt bodily stance towards objects or situations, 
which is correct or incorrect as a function of whether or not these objects and 
situations exemplify the relevant evaluative property. (Deonna and Teroni, 2012, 89)   
The bodily attitudinal theory of emotions holds that to have an emotion is to have a bodily 
attitude towards the object. The bodily attitude is a consciously felt physiological response 
to the object, which consists of “action readiness,” the feelings of the internal bodily 
changes and other bodily phenomena. Action readiness is an idea proposed by the 
psychologist Nico Frijda. The idea is that to have action readiness is to have the behavioral 
tendency to perform a particular kind of behavior. To fear the dog is to have a bodily 
attitude towards the dog and to have the attitude is to feel your body as poised to escape 
from the dog, with the feelings of your internal bodily changes and other bodily 
phenomena. 
 If we understand emotions as a consciously felt physiological response towards 
objects, then we can illustrate the importance of emotions. Emotions make us sensitive to 
the values of objects because of the bodily attitudes that are consciously felt. Emotions 
motivate us to act morally because to have a bodily attitude is to feel our body as poised to 
act in a certain way. And such behavioral dispositions are implicit evaluations of objects.  
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 Although the bodily attitudinal theory of emotions illustrates the importance of 
emotions, the theory faces at least one serious difficulty. It is said that some patients who 
suffer from severe spinal cord damage reported that they experience conscious emotions, 
(Smith, 2014). It is supposed that the patients are unable to feel the feelings of their 
internal bodily changes and perform the muscular movements since their brain is 
disconnected or poorly connected to their body. Thus, it seems that bodily attitudes are not 
necessary for emotions, which means that the bodily attitudinal theory encounters 
counter-examples. 
 To protect the bodily attitudinal theory, my contribution is to introduce the idea of 
“phantom emotions” to explain why those patients are still able to have  consciously 
emotions. My idea of phantom emotions is inspired by the occurrence of phantom limbs. 
The majority of amputees reported that they felt their limbs even internal organs that had 
been removed. They could vividly feel the shape, posture, and movement of their moved 
limbs and organs. On the basis of the occurrence of phantom limbs, I attempt to use 
phantom emotions, as a speculation, to explain why those patients can still experience 
conscious emotions since bodily attitudes consist of action readiness and other bodily 
phenomena that could emerge as phantoms. 
This thesis is divided into two sections. Section 1 investigates the nature of 
moral judgments. In section 1.1 I shall mention empirical evidence that supports the 
link between emotions and moral judgments. In section 1.2 I articulate different 
versions of moral sentimentalism and propose neo-sentimentalism dialectically, in 
order to provide a conceptual account that explains the nature of moral judgments 
that emotions have a role within. Since according to neo-sentimentalism, moral 
judgments are analyzed in terms of the judgments of an appropriate emotion, it is 
needed to clarify the notion of appropriateness. In section 1.3 I shall propose three 
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prominent theories of reasons of the right kind as possible alternatives to clarify the 
notion of being appropriate. The neo-sentimentalist understands moral judgments 
as the judgments of an appropriate emotion without actually having the emotions, 
which means that the significance of emotions seems largely weakened in the 
picture. To preserve the importance of emotions, in section 1.4 I shall introduce the 
dual-process theory to argue that emotions are a more cognitively economical way 
to make moral evaluations.  
To demonstrate other importance of emotions, namely, how emotions make 
us sensitive to the value of objects and motivate us to act morally, in section 2 I 
shall introduce the bodily attitudinal theory of emotions. Section 2.1 clarify the 
central thesis of the bodily attitudinal theory of emotions and explain why we 
should be in favor the bodily attitudinal theory of emotions rather than its rival, the 
judgmental theory of emotions. Section 2.2 is a discussion about how to justify 
emotions and value judgments. Section 2.3 explain the intentionality of emotions in 
the framework of the bodily attitudinal theory by introducing the teleological 
theory of representation. Section 2.4 considers and replies to possible objections to 
the bodily attitudinal theory. And section 2.5 proposes a method to derived moral 
emotions from non-moral emotions. 
1 Moral Sentimentalism 
Section 1 investigates moral sentimentalism. Briefly, moral sentimentalism is 
a meta-ethics theory which holds that emotions are necessary to moral judgments. 
This section is divided into four sub-sections. Section 1.1 explores empirical 
evidence which supports the link between emotions and moral judgments. Section 
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1.2 articulate different versions of moral sentimentalism. Section 1.3 examines the 
relation between the notion of appropriateness and reasons of the right kind. 
Section 1.4 replies to objections to neo-sentimentalism once the idea of 
appropriateness has been introduced into the theory. 
 
1.1 Empirical Evidence for the Link Between Emotions and Moral Judgments 
Before endorsing his version of moral sentimentalism, Prinz (2006, 30-33; 2007; 
21-47) gather a fruitful amount of empirical evidence which supports the thesis that 
emotions are related to moral judgments. Prinz understands the relation in terms of 
the conjunction of three theses. The first thesis is that emotions co-occur with 
moral judgments. The second thesis is that emotions affect moral judgment. And 
the third thesis is that emotions are necessary for moral judgments. 
1.1.1 Emotions Co-occur with Moral Judgments 
Oliveira-Souza and Eslinger (2003, 301) provides the first piece of evidence 
to support this thesis. While measuring the subjects’ brain activities, they invited 
the subjects to evaluate moral sentence such as “you should break the law when 
necessary” and non-moral sentence such as “stones are made of water.” To answer 
both kinds of sentences, the subjects only answered “right” or “wrong.” The 
emotional areas of the subject’s brain were active while evaluating moral sentences 
whereas the areas were not active while evaluating non-moral judgments.  
Sanfey et al. (2003, 1757) provide another piece of evidence to support this 
thesis. Two subjects were asked to play the ultimate game, a game which involves 
distributing monetary resources, Sanfey and his colleagues measured the subject's 
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brain activity during the play. While playing the game, one subject divided the 
monetary sums with another player. If another player found that the distribution of 
resources was unfair, the emotional areas of the player's brain would be activated.  
Berthoz et al. (2002, 1698) collected the third piece of evidence to support 
the thesis. Berthoz and the others mentioned a story to the subjects. The story is 
that one dinner guest impolitely spat food back onto the plate after the first bite 
and judge the food revolting. The emotions areas of the subject's brain were 
activated, and the subject considered the behavior to be an inappropriate violation 
of a norm.  
1.1.2 Emotion Affect Moral Judgments 
Prinz (2006, 31) mentions how other psychologists support the thesis that 
emotions affect moral judgments. Schnall and the others found that if the subjects 
had a more negative emotion, a more negative moral judgment would be made. 
They mentioned the following scenario to the subjects: 
Frank’s dog was killed by a car in front of his house. Frank had heard that in 
China people occasionally eat dog meat, and he was curious what it tasted 
like. So he cut up the body and cooked it and ate it for dinner. How wrong is 
it for Frank to eat his dead dog for dinner? (Schnall et al., 2008, 16) 
 
The subjects were asked to answer a questionnaire about the scenario and were 
divided into two groups. The subjects in the first group gave their answers on a 
clean and neat table which unlikely caused disgust, whereas the subjects in the 
second group gave their answers on a nasty table with a dirty cup, a broken pencil, 
used tissues, and a greasy pizza box which likely caused disgust. The subjects in the 
second group judged the action as morally worse whereas the subjects in the first 
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group judged the action less morally wrong. Schnall and the others interpreted this 
piece of evidence as suggesting that emotions affect moral judgments. 
However, this interpretation of proof can be challenged. It might be the case 
that the subjects' attentions were drawn to situations which possess relevant moral 
properties, which means that the subject associated the scenario with other actions 
or conditions which we deem morally questionable. It needs to establish that 
negative emotions can solely make us have “negative moral judgments even when 
we have no reason” for believing that the scenario does not possess moral 
wrongness (Prinz, 2006, 31). 
Wheatley and Haidt (2005, 780) found a piece of evidence to support the 
needed proof. Wheatley, Haidt, and the others hypnotized subjects to make them 
experience disgust suddenly when listening to the word "often." the subjects were 
told stories which contain the word "often" and other synonymous. After being 
hypnotized, the subjects felt disgusted when hearing the word "often" in the stories. 
Interestingly, although some of the stories containing many tokens of the word 
"often" described morally admirable characteristics, the subjects judged those traits 
as morally condemnable. This piece of evidence leads to the conclusion that 
negative emotions can solely cause us to have an adverse moral judgment even 
when we would otherwise find nothing morally objectionable in the scenarios. 
Besides, Murphy et.al. (2000, 18) invited subjects to evaluate the stories and 
questions given in their experiments. One of the stories describes two siblings 
having sexual intercourse. Björklund and the other asked the subjects to justify why 
the sibling incest is morally unacceptable and denied the subject's justifications. For 
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example, the subjects claimed the behavior is morally wrong because they will give 
birth to children with congenital defects, but Björklund and the others told the 
subjects that birth control is applied. After the subjects' justification had been 
challenged in this manner, the majority of the subjects still thought the action 
immoral because it is disgusting, whereas only a handful of subjects changed their 
minds about the moral status of incest (Prinz, 2006, 31). Assuming there are no 
other possibilities, either reason or emotions affect moral judgments. If the subjects 
still believed that sibling incest is morally problematic after their justifications had 
been refuted, then it seems that emotions affect moral judgments.  
1.1.3 Emotions Are Necessary for Moral Judgments 
The claim that emotions are necessary for moral judgments is stronger than 
the claim that emotions co-occur with moral judgments. The former suggests that 
emotions are necessary to moral judgments, which means that emotions are 
indispensable to moral judgments. Instead, the latter merely assets that emotions 
and moral judgments emerge in the same situation at the same time. In this sense, 
emotions may not be part of moral judgments. 
The existence of psychopathy provides strong support to the thesis that 
emotions are necessary for moral judgment (Prinz, 2006, 32). Psychopaths are those 
who have significant difficulties with experiencing pain and negative emotions like 
fear and sadness. It is also hard for psychopaths to identify facial expressions and 
tones which are related to negative emotions (Blair et al., 2001, 491-492). In other 
words, psychopaths are significantly incapable of feeling negative emotions in 
themselves and detecting negative emotions in others. Because of this incapacity, 
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psychopaths keep committing morally unacceptable actions. Prinz (2006, 32) 
believes that psychopaths act immorally because they are unable to have genuine 
moral judgments, which means that psychopaths pretend that they understand 
what "morally right" and "morally wrong" mean, but in fact, psychopaths cannot 
comprehend moral concepts in the way emotionally healthy people do. 
Blair (1995, 25) proposed that psychopaths are unable to differentiate 
between ethical and conventional rules. If we give psychopaths a set of rules and 
ask them which ones are moral and which ones are conventional, psychopaths likely 
answer the questions incorrectly. Blair (1995, 11) provides a conjecture to explain 
why psychopaths are unable to distinguish between moral and conventional rules. 
The speculation is that psychopaths lack a violence-inhibition mechanism (VIM). In 
other words, psychopaths have a psychological problem which makes them unable 
to stop themselves from committing violence. The lack of VIM is explained by the 
lack of moral emotions, and the inability to sense others’ negative emotions like 
fear and sadness. 
 Nonetheless, Prinz (2007, 45) disagrees with that the VIM model can 
satisfactorily explain psychopathy in the three following way. Firstly, psychopaths 
also commit many morally condemnable actions such as lying and manipulating 
which do not involve violence. Secondly, the VIM model cannot explain 
psychopathy’s cognitive deficiency. For instance, psychopaths make numerous 
mistakes while finishing mazes with increasing difficulties. Thirdly, the VIM model 
does not explain why psychopaths lack non-moral negative emotions like fear and 
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sadness besides the lack of moral emotions such as empathy. Another model is 
needed to explain psychopathic behavior. 
 Prinz (2007, 46) believes that Gray’s Behavior Inhibition System (BIS) is more 
capable of explaining psychopathic behavior since the core of the model is made of 
non-moral negative emotions such as anxiety and grief and negative moral 
emotions like empathic distress. The lack of the mechanism also brings psychopaths 
the deficit with changing or ceasing their behavior. 
1.1.4 Emotions, Moral judgments, and Motivational Internalism 
If emotions are necessary for moral judgments, then motivational 
internalism is sustained. The strong version of motivational internalism holds that 
one’s genuine moral judgment brings one a dominant motivation to act accordingly. 
To illustrate, if one judges that smoking is morally impermissible, then one is 
overridingly motivated not to smoke even if the temptation to smoke is present. 
Still, this version of motivational internalism is unreasonably strong because the 
theory leaves no room for the weakness of will and inclinations against the moral 
behavior. The weak version of motivational internalism holds that one’s sincere 
ethical judgment brings one a defensible motivation to act accordingly, which 
means the moral motivation can be overridden by conflicting desires or mental 
illness (Rosati, 2014, section 3.2).  
 Prinz (2015, 70) mentions an argument for motivational internalism. 
Although Prinz does not say which version of motivational internalism is supported 
by his argument; I assume that Prinz endorses the weak version of motivational 
internalism for the sake of being conservative. Prinz’s argument is that moral 
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judgments consist of emotional attitudes, and emotional attitudes are motivating. 
Therefore, moral judgments are motivating. Prinz explicitly uses the phrase 
“emotional attitudes” rather than “emotions” because emotions are directed at 
objects and they are evaluations on objects. I shall clarify what attitudes mean in 
section 2. 
 Since the premise that moral judgments contain emotions is sustained by 
the empirical evidence mentioned in the previous sub-sections, I focus on justifying 
the claim that emotions are motivating. Although our daily experience tells us that 
emotions are motivating, the claim will be more fortified if empirical evidence is 
brought to support it. McMillen and Austin (1971, 60) suggest that moral emotions 
play a major role in promoting pro-social behavior. Evidence indicates that one who 
feels guilty is more willing to perform compensational actions. For instance, 
subjects who had cheated in an examination helped people for 62 minutes 
averagely, while those who had not cheated in the test helped people merely for 2 
minutes. Feeling guilty makes one bring compensation, and anticipating the feeling 
makes one abler to resist future temptations. Furthermore, Prinz and Nichols (2010, 
130) studied the psychological profile of anger. If a person has done a wrongdoing 
to one, the one will feel angry at the person and are motivated to retaliate. Intense 
anger would even motivate one to seek vengeance with a risk of paying a heavy 
price. These studies suggest that emotions are motivating. 
1.2 Different Versions of Moral Sentimentalism 
 The previous sub-section mentions how emotions are related to moral 
judgments, and we have reasons for believing that moral judgment consists of 
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emotions. Then the following question is: Emotions are necessary to moral 
judgments in what way? I shall discuss Slote’s and Prinz’s moral sentimentalism and 
neo-sentimentalism below. 
1.2.1 Slote’s Sentimentalism 
 To introduce and articulate the version of moral sentimentalism which I 
endorse, I shall first describe Michael Slote’s moral sentimentalism because his 
version is specific and one of the strongest accounts of moral sentimentalism. The 
central thesis of Slote’s account is as follows: 
(SS) An action is judged morally admirable (or morally condemnable) if and 
only if the action manifests one’s agential empathy (or the lack of agential 
empathy), and we feel warmed (or chilled) by one’s agential empathy (or the 
lack of agential empathy). (Slote, 2010, 63; Watson, 2011, 143) 
Moral judgments in (SS) consist of two layers. The first layer involves one’s agential 
empathy towards another person. When one shows one’s agential empathy 
towards another person, one shows an emotional response to the person’s pain or 
needs. Clearly speaking, as Slote and Watson understand it, one’ agential empathy 
is that one feels what another person feels:  
I pointed out earlier: namely, that sort of “sympathy” Hume is talking about 
is or involves what we nowadays usually refer to as empathy (rather than as 
sympathy) the kind of phenomenon Bill Clinton was invoking or referring to 
when he said, “I feel your pain.” (Slote, 2010, 30)  
When I say I empathize, I do mean “empathize” and not “sympathize,” I feel 





The second layer is where moral approval (or disapproval) comes out. This moral 
approval  (or disapproval) is our empathy towards one’s agential empathy. We are 
warmed if one demonstrates one’s agential empathy towards another person, 
whereas we are chilled if one shows the lack of one’s agential empathy towards 
another person. This empathetic warmth (or chill) is moral approval (or disapproval). 
 Watson (2011, 143) mentions a counter-example to (SS). Sometimes one 
demonstrates one’s agential empathy towards another person, and we feel warmed 
by one’s agential empathy, yet one’s judged as morally wrong. We have a reason for 
rejecting (SS) if such counter-example exists: 
The example I wish to develop, as a test case, is of a battered woman who 
will not leave her husband, as is not uncommon. Imagine further that his 
refusal to leave is not purely practical or strategic but is grounded in the 
belief that he will change, that he does not really mean to harm her, that he 
really loves her, and so forth. To add details to the case, suppose her 
husband is a returning veteran, experiencing PTSD, and was a loving 
husband prior to combat. Yet he cannot get his violent outbursts under 
control. She feels conflicted and hopes that he will recover, but in the 
meantime, she suffers abuse. We think she is in a horrible circumstance, and 
it pains us to think of her plight. (Watson, 2011, 143) 
We need to be aware of that in the above scenario there are two different tokens of 
agential empathy. The first token is the wife’s empathy towards her husband which 
causes her choose to stay with her husband. The second token is our agential 
 17 
 
empathy towards the wife as we think that she is a victim of such circumstance. The 
first token is what we should concern here. 
 It seems that we that although the wife’s agential empathy towards her 
husband make us feel warmed, we tend to think that the wife is taking a morally 
wrong action because she chooses to stay with her husband. The right action would 
be to leave her husband to guarantee her safety and help her husband while 
keeping her distance.  
 To make sure that she treats (SS) fairly, Watson (2011, 144) think that we 
need to think whether the moral judgment that it is morally wrong for the wife to 
stay with her husband can be captured by (SS). Indeed, we are warmed by her 
agential empathy towards his husband, but we judge that her choice is morally 
wrong because she lacks agential empathy towards herself, and this lack chills us. If 
self-directed agential empathy is possible, then (SS) can avoid this counter-example. 
However, Slote explicitly states that self-care or self-directed action is not of our 
moral concern, and Slote only mentions that agential empathy is other-directed: 
Thus, empathy involves having the feelings of another (involuntarily) 
aroused in ourselves, as when we see another person in pain. (Slote, 2010, 
15) 
 
If Slote does not mention that empathy is not self-directed, then the above counter-
example cannot be explained away by (SS). 
1.2.2 Prinz’s Sentimentalism 
 Prinz offers a less specific and strong account of moral sentimentalism. The 
following is the central thesis of Prinz’s account: 
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(PS) An action is judged morally wrong if and only if we have a negative 
sentiment towards the action. (Prinz, 2006, 33) 
Prinz has his use of the word “sentiment.” By “sentiment” Prinz means a disposition 
to have certain kinds of emotions: 
Sentiment of Approbation and disapprobation are, likewise, constituted by 
different emotions on different occasions.” (Prinz, 2006, 34)  
 
A disapprobation, in Prinz’s understanding, is a category which involves negative 
emotions such as shame, guilt, anger, contempt, and disgust. If one deems what 
another person has done immoral, then one has the disposition to have a negative 
emotion, such as anger and disgust, towards another person’s action. If one deems 
what one has done is morally condemnable, which means that one has the 
disposition to feel guilty or ashamed. Nonetheless, for the sake of simplicity, I put 
side the category issue and the words “sentiments” and “emotions” 
interchangeably here. 
 Although (PS) can avoid the counter-example to (PS) because (PS) does not 
take empathy as moral emotions in its framework, (PS) is still problematic since (PS) 
faces its counter-examples as well. There are two kinds of counter-examples which 
suggest that emotions are neither sufficient nor necessary to moral judgments. The 
first kind is the recalcitrance of emotions and the second kind is the recalcitrance of 
judgments. 
 The problem of the recalcitrance of emotions is used to attack the 
judgmental theory of emotions, a view which holds that value judgments are 
necessary to emotions. The problem is the judgmental theory preserves no room to 
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permit emotions to conflict with the corresponding value judgments (D’Arms and 
Jacabson, 2003, 129). This problem also bothers (PS). To have a recalcitrant emotion 
is to have the emotion even one does not believe the corresponding value 
judgment. The problem of the recalcitrance of judgments is that sometimes we 
have a value judgment even if the relevant emotion does not exist.  
 Interestingly, Prinz himself mentions the instantiations of the recalcitrance 
of emotions and judgments: 
Imagine a mob hit man who is going through a process of reform. He may 
not experience any sentiment of disapprobation towards killing, but he 
nevertheless judges that killing is wrong. That suggests that sentiments are 
not necessary. Or consider a person who was raised to think homosexuality 
is wrong, but now rejects that view. She may still harbor irrepressible 
negative sentiments when she thinks about homosexuality even though she 
insists that homosexuality is morally acceptable. That suggests that 
sentiments are not sufficient for moral judgments. (Prinz, 2007, 112) 
 
Note that Prinz does not stand for a contradictory position because Prinz has held a 
consistent stance through years according to his works  (Prinz, 2006, 33; 2007, 94, 
2015, 70). Prinz mentions the above counter-examples for demonstrating how he 
could explain away the counter-examples by what he calls “second-order emotions.” 
1.2.3 Neo-Sentimentalism 
 The counter-example to (PS) leads us to believe that we need to adopt a 
more sophisticated version of moral sentimentalism, and neo-sentimentalism fits 
our purposes. The following is the central thesis of the theory: 
(NS) To judge an action A to have some evaluative property A (goodness, 
badness, rightness, wrongness…) is to judge it appropriate (warranted, 
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justified…) to have an associated emotional response (guilt, resentment, 
contempt…) toward A. (Sauer, 2011, 111) 
With the notion of appropriateness, (NS) can avoid the counter-examples to (PS). 
Prinz (2007, 114) illustrates how the idea of appropriateness can explain away the 
above counter-examples. Although the mob hit man experiences no negative 
emotion towards killing, he judges that killing is wrong because he deems feeling 
guilty for killing appropriate. Although the person experiences an irrepressible 
negative emotion towards homosexuality, she maintains that the judgment that 
being homosexual is morally permissible because she deems having a negative 
sentiment towards this sexual orientation inappropriate. 
 (NS) is immune to the counter-examples to (PS) because if it is appropriate 
to have a negative emotion towards killing, it means that we have a right reason for 
having the negative emotion, and the same reason is also for having the 
corresponding moral judgment. In other words, the concept of appropriateness 
prevents the recalcitrance of emotions and judgments by unifying emotions and 
moral judgment. 
 Prinz (2007, 113) attempts to analyze the notion of appropriateness as 
second-order emotions. A second order emotion is an emotion which is directed at 
a first-order emotion, an emotion directed at an object. The mob hit man deems 
having a negative emotion towards killing appropriate because he has a second-
order negative emotion towards not having a negative emotion towards killing. The 
person deems having a negative emotion towards homosexuality inappropriate 
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because she has a second-order negative emotion towards having a negative 
emotion towards being homosexual. 
 Nonetheless, I disagree with that the notion of appropriateness can be 
analyzed in terms of second-order emotions. Firstly, it is unclear that all first-order 
emotions are accompanied by second-order emotions. Is my admiration towards 
the Mother Teresa’s sacrifice accompanied by a second-order emotion? Secondly, 
assuming that second-order emotions accompany all first-order emotions, but what 
make second-order emotions appropriate? Third-order emotions? It seems that 
Prinz’s analysis leads to an infinite regress. Perhaps some might say that it is not 
required to deem second-order emotions appropriate or inappropriate. Buy why 
not? Is it because second-order emotions are different from first-order emotions? 
But what is the difference? If first-order emotions need to be deemed appropriate 
or inappropriate, and there is no difference between first-order and second-order 
emotions, then it is unclear why it is not mandatory to deem second-order 
emotions appropriate or inappropriate as well. There are three other prominent 
ways of explaining the notion of appropriateness.  
 Furthermore, to judge that killing is morally wrong is to judge that it is 
appropriate to have a negative emotion towards killing, but we should not 
understand that the judgment of the appropriate emotion is always accompanied 
by an actual emotion. It is simply the judgment that it is appropriate to have the 
negative emotion. If the judgment of the appropriate emotion required an actual 
emotion, then neo-sentimentalism would suffer from the problem of the 
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recalcitrance of emotions as well, since it is possible that one judge that it is 
appropriate to resent killing without actually experiencing the anger towards killing.  
1.3 Appropriateness and Reasons of the Right Kind 
To be appropriate to have a negative emotion is to have a right reason for 
having the emotion. Based on the textual evidence, some scholars such Schroeder 
and Sauer, identify the notion of appropriateness with reasons of the right kind. 
“This is because the point of the distinction between the “right” and “wrong” kinds 
of reason, is that only the “right” kind contributes to standards of correctness…,” 
Schroeder (2008, 13) writes. Sauer (2011, 115) repeatedly treat the notion of 
appropriateness the reasons of the right kind interchangeably. These pieces of 
textual evidence support that the concepts of appropriateness refer to reasons of 
the right kind. 
1.3.1 Scanlon’s Buck-Passing Account of Value 
 According to (NS), to judge that an action is wrong is to judge that it is 
appropriate to have a negative emotion towards the action, and this thesis is 
parallel to Scanlon’s account: 
(BPV) The alternative, which I believe to be correct, is to hold that being 
good, or valuable, is not a property that itself provides a reason to respond 
to a thing in certain ways. Rather, to be good or valuable is to have other 
properties that constitute such reasons. (Scanlon, 1998, 97) 
 
(BPV) holds that for an object to be valuable is not that the feature of being 
valuable “gives us a reason to respond to the object in a certain way” (Scanlon, 
1998, 97), but is that the properties other than the property of being valuable to 
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give us a reason to show a particular response towards to the object. (Samuelsson, 
2013, 1). 
 Since the role of giving us a reason for responding to the object in a certain 
way is passed to the properties other than the property of being valuable, the 
account is called a “buck-passing account” (Scanlon, 1998, 97). Applying (BPV) to 
(NS) amounts to saying that for an action to be morally wrong, is not a matter of the 
property of being morally wrong giving us a reason for responding to the behavior 
in a certain way. Instead, it is to say that the properties other the property of being 
morally wrong to give us a reason for having a particular negative emotional 
response towards the action. 
 
1.3.2 Wrong Kinds of Reason Problem 
Scanlon’s account leads to wrong kinds of reason problem (WKRP). This 
issue holds that sometimes we have a reason for responding to an object in a 
certain way, yet the object itself lacks the corresponding value (or properties that 
constitute the value) (Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen, 2004, 393; Samuelsson, 
2013, 1). Rabinowicz and Rønnow (2004, 402) vividly illustrate this problem by 
inviting us to imagine that “a powerful demon threatens to impose severe pain on 
us uncles we admire the devil.” This threat seems to give us a strong reason for 
praising the mighty fiend, yet we tend not to think that the demon is admirable (or 
has properties that constitute the properties of being admirable). However, 
according to (BPV), the demon’s intention to impose severe pain on us is a property 
other than the property of being admirable gives us a reason for admiring the 
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demon. It leads us to believe that this reason for admiring the demon is a wrong 
reason, and thus, we need to exclude wrong reasons from right reasons 
(Samuelsson, 2013, 2). 
Since the structure of (NS) is parallel to the framework (BPV), (NS) would 
suffer from the same problem if (WKRP) were not solved. I shall mention three 
prominent theories of reasons of the right kind which are alternatives to deal with 
(WKRP). 
1.3.3 Lang and Samuelsson’s Account of Reasons of the Right Kind 
 Lang proposes a theory of reasons of the right kind, and Lang’s account is 
challenged by Olson’s objection, then Samuelsson replies to Olson’s criticism, which 
means that the account is co-developed by Lang and Samuelsson. Lang has modified 
(BPV) six times and the following is the central of the Lang’s theory: 
(BPV6) An object is valuable if and only if the object has properties other 
than the property of being valuable that give us a reason to show a certain 
attitude towards the object, as long as those properties would still be 
reason-giving in the absence of the benefits to us of showing the certain 
attitude towards the object. (Lang, 2008, 484) 
(BPV6) seems able to exclude the demon’s threat from reasons of the right kind, 
because the threat as a property other than the property of being admirable, would 
not longer be reason-giving to us if the demon stopped threatening to punish us. In 
other words, if the demon does not force us to admire him, then we no longer have 
a reason for admiring the demon. A reason of the right kind must not be such a 
 25 
 
prudential reason. Nonetheless, (BPV6) is further attacked by Olson’s counter-
example: 
Suppose for instance that an evil demon threatens to inflict severe pain on 
people on the other side of Earth, who are all strangers to us, unless we 
favour him. That seems to provide reason for us to favour the demon even 
though we would not benefit from favouring him. (Olson, 2009, 226) 
 
Another wrong reason for admiring the devil comes into the picture. This counter-
example is about the advantages of ours but of others. If the demon threatens to 
impose severe pain on people who we have never met, we seem to have a reason 
for admiring the devil, yet the demon still does not deserve being admired. To avoid 
the further counter-example and the other possible variations of the example, 
Samuelsson modifies (BPV6) in the following way: 
(BPV11) An object is valuable if and only if the object has properties other 
than the property of being valuable that give us a reason to show a certain 
attitude towards the object, as long as those properties would still be 
reason-giving in the absence of any consequences of showing the certain 
attitude towards the object. (Samuelsson, 2013, 7) 
According to (BPV11), no matter what the demon would do to anyone, we would 
not have a right reason for admiring the devil, because any consequence that the 
devil would bring are not of our concern. (BPV11) is further objected because of its 
incompatibility with consequentialism, but I shall not discuss this criticism here. 
1.3.4 Schroeder’s Account of Reasons of the Right Kind 
 Before introducing his account of reasons of the right kind in his article, 
Schroeder distinguishes two kinds of wrong reasons. The first kind of wrong reasons 
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is that one engages in an activity for extra benefits. For instance, John admires the 
mighty devil for avoiding his punishment, or Jack believes the judgment that Mars is 
green for a huge amount of incentives. John and Jack’s reasons are reasons for 
some people to engage in activities, but those reasons are not reasons for anyone 
to do something (Schroeder, 2008, 11). 
 Schroeder (2008, 12) illustrate the first kind of wrong reasons with the 
following example: if your son is being brought to court for murder, and you would 
experience a great torment if you believe that your son was guilty. Then you have a 
reason for refusing to accept the belief that your son is guilty, yet your reason is not 
anyone’s reason for believing that your son is not guilty. 
 Schroeder (2008, 12) also mentions another example from Gregory Kavka. If 
a billionaire promises that he will give you a huge amount of incentives in exchange 
fro your intention to drink the poison before tomorrow, then you have a reason for 
intending to drink the position now, but this reason is only available at a particular 
time but not any time. The similarity shared by all of this two kinds of wrong 
reasons is that being idiosyncratic. By idiosyncratic, it means that these reasons are 
only valid for particular people who engage in certain activities. And the meaning of 
activities refers to any mental and physical actions in a broad sense. 
 The second kind of wrong reasons is that we sometimes conflate a kind of 
reasons with another kind. Schroeder believes that good instances of the second 
kind of wrong reasons are moral reasons. Imagine that someone makes a cruel but 
amusing joke at a gathering. We have a reason for not laughing at the joke because 
it is immoral to do so, but this moral reason does not make the joke less assuming 
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(D’Arm and Jacobson, 2000, 731). Moral reasons are universal in the way that the 
reasons are valid to anyone, whereas the idiosyncratic reasons are only valid to a 
particular kind of people who engage in a certain kind of activities. 
 After illustrating the characteristics of wrong reasons, Schroeder introduces 
an account to exclude such reasons. The following is the central thesis of 
Schroeder’s theory: 
(SRKR) If a reason belongs to the right kind of reasons for engaging in an 
activity A if and only if the reason is shared necessarily by anyone who 
engages in A, and just because engaging in A (Schroeder, 2008, 13). 
The “shared necessarily by anyone engages in A” part is important to differentiate 
the first kind of wrong reasons from right reasons, because the part is meant to 
exclude idiosyncratic reasons. If a reason is a right reason for engaging in an activity, 
then the reason is shared necessarily by anyone who engages in the activity and 
vice versa. The reason that the dog has properties that constitute fearsomeness is a 
right reason for fearing the dog because the reason is shared by necessarily who 
fears the dog. To illustrate, the dog performs an aggressive and impulsive behavior 
and has big claws and sharp teeth that are extremely likely to bring colossal even 
lethal damage to one’s physical integrity. These features make any who has 
interactions with the dog believe that their physical integrity would be heavily 
damaged, or even their lives would be terminated if attacked by the dog. Thus, the 
features would constitute fearsomeness and are the reason for fearing dog that is 
shared by any who has interactions with the dog (if they are made of flesh and 
blood).  Instead, the reason that a billionaire promises that he will give you a million 
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dollars if you fear the dog is not a right reason since the reason is not shared by 
necessarily who fears the dog. Some people simply are not interested in money or 
any benefits.  
 The “just because engaging in A” part is also crucial to differentiate the 
second kind of wrong reasons from right reasons because the part is meant to 
exclude universal reasons that can be applied to other activities. If a reason is a 
right reason for engaging in an activity, then the reason can only be applied the 
activity, and vice versa. The reason that the dog has properties that constitute 
fearsomeness is a reason for fearing the dog because this reason cannot be applied 
to other activities. On the contrary, a moral reason, say, God’s command is not a 
right reason for fearing the dog because God’s command can be applied to other 
activities. 
1.3.5 Hieronymi’s Account of Reasons of the Right Kind 
 According to Hieronymi (2005, 448; Birondo, 2014, 128), (WKRP) arises from 
our traditional understanding of reasons. Traditionally, we think that to have a 
reason is to have a consideration for an activity. The understanding conflates wrong 
reasons with right reason. If the demon threatens to impose severe pain on us 
unless we admire the demon, then we have a reason for admiring the devil, which 
means that we have a consideration for admiring the demon. Also, assume that the 
demon is in fact admirable (or has properties that constitute the property of being 
admirable), then we have another reason for admiring the demon, which means 
that we have another consideration for admiring the demon. Based on the 
traditional understanding of reasons, both reasons are also considerations for 
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admiring the demon, yet we have no resource for differentiating between these 
reasons which belong to different categories. 
 Therefore, Hieronymi suggests that we should abandon the traditional 
understanding and adopt her alternative: 
(HRKR) to have a right reason for engaging in an activity is to have a 
consideration which bears on the relevant question. 
If the demon threatens to impose severe pain on us unless we admire the demon, 
then we have a reason for admiring the demon, which means that we have a 
consideration which bears on the prudential question whether it is beneficial to 
admire the demon. Assume that the demon is admirable (or has properties that 
constitute the property of being admirable), then we have a consideration for 
admiring the demon which bears on the emotional question whether the demon is 
admirable (or has properties that constitute the property of being admirable). For 
example, assume that the demon is totally selfless, solidly courageous and 
extraordinarily determined. These features make us believe the demon as a role-
model on many different aspects, and thus the features give us a consideration for 
admiring the demon.  Based on Hieronymi’s understanding of reasons, now we have 
resources for differentiating between distinct kinds of considerations.  
1.3.6 Plausibility of the Accounts of Right Kinds of Reasons 
After clarifying the three theories of reasons of the right kind, I need to explain why 
these candidates are equally plausible. Here is my argument: 
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(1) If a theory of reasons of the right kind can differentiate between emotional 
appropriateness and prudential appropriateness, then the theory fulfills one 
of the necessary conditions for being a plausible theory of reasons of the 
right kind. 
(2) Hieronymi, Schroeder, and Lang and Samuelsson’s theories can distinguish 
between these different kinds of appropriateness. 
Thus, 
(3) Hieronymi, Schroeder, and Lang and Samuelsson’s accounts fulfill one of the 
necessary conditions for being a plausible theory of reasons of the right kind.  
Premise (1) is needed because of the conflation problem. This issue is that one type 
of appropriateness can be conflated other types of appropriateness (Sauer, 2011, 
112).  
The following example illustrates how emotional appropriateness can be conflated 
with moral appropriateness:  
John the Great is an ambitious dedicatory king who has a singular, personal 
and unshakable determination, namely, conquering the world with his 
massive army formed by huge groups of innocent civilians. 
It is appropriate to admire his singular unshakable determination because it is 
admirable (or has properties that constitute the property of being admirable). But it 
is appropriate not to admire his determination because such a determination is 




D’Arms and Jacobson also illustrate how emotional appropriateness can be 
conflated with prudential appropriateness: 
“Imagine that you have a rich and generous but touchy friend, who is 
extremely sensitive about his friends’ attitude toward his wealth. If he 
suspects you of envying his possessions, he will curtail his largesse. That is a 
good reason not to envy him, […] but surely it doesn’t speak to whether his 
possessions are enviable. (D’Arms and Jacobson, 2000, 731) 
Neo-sentimentalism holds that to judge an object has a particular value is to judge 
that it is appropriate to have a certain emotion towards the object, but neo-
sentimentalism needs extra resources to differentiate between distinct kinds of 
appropriateness, and theories of right kinds of reasons play a role in identifying 
distinct types of appropriateness. Furthermore, Deonna and Teroni (2012, 7) 
suggest that it is needed to distinguish between emotional appropriateness and 
other types of appropriateness such as prudential appropriateness.  
 Lang and Samuelsson’s theory can distinguish between emotional 
appropriateness and prudential appropriateness. Their theory holds that your 
friend’s wealth is enviable if and only if the wealth has properties other than its 
property of being enviable that give us a reason to envy the wealth, as long as the 
properties would still give us a reason to envy the wealth in the absence of any 
consequences of envying the wealth. Taking benefits from your rich friend is a 
consequence of not envying the wealth, thus, this talking is not a right reason for 
not envying the wealth. 
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 Schroeder’s theory can distinguish between emotional appropriateness and 
prudential appropriateness because of the criterion “the reason is shared 
necessarily by anyone who engages in A” in (SRKR). Taking benefits from your rich 
friend is not a right reason for not envying the wealth since this reason is not shared 
necessarily by anyone who engages in not envying the wealth. Some people are just 
not interested in taking benefits from your friend.   
Hieronymi’s account can distinguish between emotional appropriateness 
and prudential appropriateness. If your friend’s wealth is enviable (or has properties 
that constitute the property of being enviable), then you have a reason for envying 
the wealth, and this reason bears on the question whether your friend’s property is 
enviable (or has properties that constitute the property of being enviable). If your 
friend would give you fewer benefits if you envy your friend’s wealth, then you have 
a reason for not envying the wealth, and this reason is a consideration which bears 
on the question whether it would be beneficial to envy your friend’s wealth. The 
first consideration bears on an emotional question, whereas the second 
consideration bears on a prudential question, and thus we can distinguish between 
emotional appropriateness and prudential appropriateness in this case. 
It is worth saying that theories of right kinds of reasons can make a 
distinction between emotional appropriates, prudential appropriateness, but neo-
sentimentalists do not have to differentiate between emotional appropriateness 
and moral appropriateness here. If we endorse neo-sentimentalism, then to judge 
that it is immoral to take an action is to judge that it is appropriate to have a 
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negative emotion towards the behavior. In other words, the neo-sentimentalist 
reduces moral appropriateness to emotional appropriateness.  
1.4 Objections towards Neo-Sentimentalism 
Although the notion of appropriateness helps neo-sentimentalism avoids 
the problem of the recalcitrance of emotions and judgments, the theory apparently 
faces at least two objections because introducing the concept of appropriateness 
seems to entails that emotions are no longer important in this picture. It is 
apparently the case that reason alone is sufficient to provide one moral knowledge 
and motivate one to act morally. To defend the importance of emotions in the 
framework of neo-sentimentalism, I shall articulate and reply to two possible 
objections. Emotions have three different kinds of importance. The first kind is that 
emotions are a more cognitive-economical way to make moral evaluations. The 
second kind is that emotions make us sensitive to the values of the objects in 
environments. The third kind is that emotions motivate us to act morally. I shall 
articulate the first kind of importance in section 1.4, and clarify the other kinds of 
importance section 2.  
1.4.1 An Epistemic Objection and Reply 
If we accept neo-sentimentalism, then to judge that an action is morally 
wrong is to judge that it is appropriate to have a negative emotion towards the 
behavior, without actually having an emotion. To be appropriate to have a negative 
emotion is to have a right reason (in either Lang’s, Schroeder’s, or Hieromyni’s 
senses) for having the emotion. A natural objection is that the right reason for 
having the emotion would also say what non-moral properties would constitute 
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moral properties. In other words, it is another way which bypasses emotions to gain 
moral knowledge. It leads us to believe that it is epistemically superfluous to gain 
moral knowledge via emotions. 
 I do not deny that reason can bypass emotion to make moral judgments, but 
I attempt to claim that emotions are a more efficient way to make moral 
evaluations. Such moral evaluations are implicit, which means that evaluations are 
manifested via something other than judgments, such as consciously felt 
physiological reactions towards objects. (I shall explain the meaning of evaluations 
as consciously felt physiological reactions in section 2). In psychology, the dual-
process theory, a view which holds that mind is divided into two systems is widely 
accepted. System 1 involves automatic heuristic-based responses, and is fast, 
cognitively economical, and relatively narrow in scope, whereas system 2 involves 
conscious deliberation, and is slow, cognitively resource-demanding, but more 
flexible (Holton, 2009, 54). Spripada (2010, 795) suggests that system 1 includes 
“simply associative operations, and has access to limited information, whereas 
system 2 includes linguistic or logical representations, and has access to larger and 
more global stores of information.” And Levy (2010, 145) claims that system 1 is 
undemanding of cognitive resources whereas system 2 is demanding of them. The 
fewer cognitive resources one has, the more difficult it is for one to function under 
system 2; the resources are depleted only if one is unavoidably switched to system 
2. It is suggested that cognitive resources are related to glucose since the operation 
of the brain requires a tremendous amount of blood sugar, and the processes of the 




Also, Greene (2007, 322) developed a dual-process theory of moral 
judgments. The dual process theory holds that there are two different ways to do 
moral reasoning in the brain. The first way is to make automatic and imminent 
reactions to actions that violate morality. These reactions are implicit and one might 
not consciously get access to the causes of the reactions. Greene believes that the 
automatic and imminent reactions are activated by the emotional areas in the brain. 
The second way is to do conscious and deliberative moral reasoning. Such reasoning 
is different from the emotional responses to the violation of morality. The reasoning 
is instead utilitarian: it focuses on how to maximize the benefits and minimalize the 
losses in the overall picture. Furthermore, Greene states that people who suffer 
from the damage in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), a part which is 
related to the activation of emotions in the brain, tend to make utilitarian reasoning 
and decisions. Greene’s theory matches the descriptions of system 1 and system 2 
given by the philosophers mentioned above, saying that human beings have two 
ways to make moral evaluations. 
If I attempt to introduce Greene's theory to my picture, then I need to solve 
a puzzle: If psychopaths do not concern the well-being of others because of the lack 
of moral emotions like empathy, then why psychopaths would make utilitarian 
moral decisions, which would not only benefit their own interests but also others'? 
Koenigs et al. (2011) studied in a comparison between psychopaths and non-
psychopaths. They further divided the group of psychopaths into the group of 
psychopaths with a high level of anxiety and the group of psychopaths with a low 
level of anxiety. They invited the subjects to make moral judgments in hypothetical 
scenarios with moral dilemmas. The moral dilemmas describe “personal” and 
 36 
 
“impersonal” actions. By “personal” it means actions that directly involve physical 
harms (such as “pushing one person off a bridge to stop a runaway train car from 
hitting five people”), whereas by “impersonal” it refers to actions that indirectly 
involve harms or cause harm remotely (like “pulling a switch to divert a runaway 
train car from hitting five people”). Both groups of psychopaths preferred taking 
impersonal actions. Yet only psychopaths with a low level of anxiety were in favor of 
executing personal harms if the harm would maximize the welfare of the overall 
individual. 
To answer this question, it seems that Blair's speculation provides us a clue. 
Blair (1997) claims that psychopaths are unable to distinguish moral rules from 
conventional rules, yet they tend to treats both kinds of rules as inviolable as moral 
rules. Blair speculates that psychopaths attempt to persuade people that they are 
morally healthy. This founding suggests that psychopaths are dishonest and even 
cunning. Based on the deviousness of psychopaths, I am tempted to say that they 
express utilitarian moral reasoning and decisions because they realize that making 
and expressing utilitarian moral decisions can maximize their own interests. Instead, 
if they make and express decisions that only concern their own interests explicitly, 
then people would avoid having interactions with them, and thus they cannot 
maximize their own benefits because being unwelcome in society. After briefly 
presenting the dual-process theories and ego depletion, I argue as follows: 
(4) Making moral evaluations via emotions is a process under system 1. 
(5) Making moral evaluations via reason is a process under system 2. 
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(6) Processes under system 1 are more cognitively economical than processes 
understand system 2. 
Thus,  
(7) Making moral evaluations via emotions is more cognitively economical than 
making moral evaluations via reason. (From (4) to (6).) 
Premise (4) is supported by evidence about decision-making and emotions. Bechara 
et al. (2000, 297) invented “the gambling game” and invited subjects to play this 
game to investigate the emotional influences on decision-making. The game 
simulates real-life situations which include uncertainty, rewards, and punishments, 
and the goal of the game is to get benefits based on the loaned money. The game 
had 100 rounds (the subjects were not told about this) and there were four tables 
named as A, B, C, and D. In each round they were allowed to select only one card 
from only one of the tables and were allowed to move to another table at any 
moment as they wanted. The game was followed by a series of rewards and 
punishments which were only known to the examiners. If subjects took a card from 
table A or B, they would gain $100 whereas if they took a card from table C or D, 
they would only gain $50. Nevertheless, the punishments which were unknown to 
the subjects were meted out more on table A and B than table C and D. Every 10 
rounds, the subjects would lose $1250 on tables A and B, where they would lose 
only $250 on tables C and D. Measuring in long-term, table A and B were more 
disadvantaged because the subjects would lose $250 from table A and B in every 10 
rounds whereas they would gain $250 on table C and D. 
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 After the tenth round, the subjects were asked whether they had an idea of 
how the game operated. Meanwhile, their skin conductance responses (SCRs), 
which indicate emotional responses, were measured. In the first ten rounds, the 
subjects had mainly chosen the cards on table A and B, and thus they suffered their 
first losses. After the fiftieth round, the subjects started to choose cards from table 
C and D more frequently, and their anticipatory SCRs were activated stronger right 
at the moment before choosing card from table A and B than table C and D. 
Interestingly, at this stage the subjects reported that they had no idea of what was 
happening. After the eightieth round, Bechara, and the others claim that the subject 
has a “hunch” about what was happening and began to mainly choose a card from 
table C and D. The subjects reported that they liked tables C and D and guessed that 
the tables were more rewarding than tables A and B without certainty.  
  Here is another story which is similar to the card game. A firefighter felt that 
the situation was not right without knowing what was going on exactly: 
 It is a simple house ﬁre in a one-storey house in a residential neighborhood. 
The ﬁre is in the back, in the kitchen area. The lieutenant leads his hose crew 
into the building, to the back, to spray water on the ﬁre, but the ﬁre just 
roars back at them. ‘‘Odd,’’ he thinks. The water should have more of an 
impact. They try dousing it again, and get the same results. They retreat a 
few steps to regroup. Then the lieutenant starts to feel as if something is not 
right. He doesn’t have any clues; he just doesn’t feel right about being in 
that house, so he orders his men out of the building—a perfectly standard 
building with nothing out of the ordinary. As soon as his men leave the 
building, the ﬂoor where they had been standing collapses. Had they still 
been inside, they would have been plunged into the ﬁre below. (Klein, 1998, 
32) 
 
In the card game, it seems that the subject did not deliberate because they 
reported that they did not know what was happening in detail, and they claimed 
that they like tables C and D and that they guess tables C and D were safer. 
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Moreover, they naturally changed their behavior, moving to tables C and D from 
tables A and B. In the firefighting case, the lieutenant made the decision to leave 
the building based on his emotional response which indicated the heat of the fire 
and the lack of noise which was relative to the fire, but the lieutenant had not been 
aware of what spurred his feeling until Klein and his colleagues gave him their 
analysis (Holton, 2009, 63). These likings, guessings, and feelings fit the descriptions 
of system 1, and thus we have a reason to believe that these and similar emotional 
processes are governed by that sort of cognitive system.  
 Premise (5) is obviously true since it fits our daily experience. If we have 
finished our dinner and are about to pay the bill equally, dividing the total amount 
of the bill requires deliberative mathematical processes, no matter how simple the 
calculation is. Also, we have a good reason to believe that logical operations are 
under system 2 because rational calculation and making choices are ego depleting 
(Levy, 2010, 145). 
 Premise (6) is clarified by the notion of ego depletion. If making moral 
evaluations by emotions is a process under system 1, then making moral 
evaluations in this way does not require many cognitive resources. Instead, if one 
makes moral evaluations under system 2, then one makes moral evaluations in a 
cognitively resources-demanding way. Practically speaking, if both ways are 
channels to moral evaluations, and making moral evaluations is more economical 
under system 1, then it is unclear why making moral evaluations via emotion is not 
a preferred choice, although we can make moral evaluations by reason as well. 
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 It needs to be mentioned that emotions and reason are equally reliable in 
terms of generating moral evaluations. Reliabilism for justification holds that a 
belief is justified if and only if the belief is produced by a reliable belief-making 
process (Becker, n.d., introduction). The examples of the reliable belief-making 
process include perception, solid memory, calculating, whereas guessing, wishful 
thinking are the examples of unreliable processes. The former kind of belief-making 
processes is reliable because they tend to produce true belief whereas the latter 
kind tends to produce false belief. We can also apply reliabilism to emotions. if an 
emotion is produced by a reliable emotion-making process, then the emotion-
generated moral evaluations are equally justified as the judgments deriving from 
the operation of system 2 since reliably generated emotions are likely to be correct 
and thus the correspondent moral judgments are likely to be true. 
 It needs to explain why emotion-generated evaluations and the judgment 
driving from the operation of system 2 are equally justified. Both emotions and 
value judgments are mind-to-world, which means that they represent something 
outside the external world. To allow one’s emotions and judgments to represent 
something, there must be reliable emotion/judgment-making processes as proper 
channels between one and the external world which are shared by both kinds of 
mental states. If I see John and hear the sounds of his footsteps, then my belief that 
John is there is justified since the belief is formed via my visual and audio 
perceptions that are proper connections to the external world. If I see the big claws 
and sharp teeth of the dog and hear that the dog is barking at me, then my fear of 
the dog is justified as well because the emotion is formed via the proper channels. 
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In section 2 I shall propose a more sophisticated version of reliabilism called agent 
reliabilism.  
1.4.2 A Motivational Objection and Reply 
Suppose that some workers are unavoidably working right outside your 
office in the department of philosophy. You are annoyed by the noise they make, 
and it seems that you have a right reason to feel annoyed because the properties of 
the noise would constitute the property of being annoying. However, at this 
moment, you suppress your emotion because you judge that the workers are just 
doing their job, and you ought not to show your ire towards people who are just 
doing their jobs unavoidably outside your office. This “ought” seems to give you 
some motivating force not to unleash your ire, which means that there is another 
source other than emotions, perhaps reason, to motivate you.  
 Although I disagree with that Prinz’s understanding of the notion of 
appropriateness, we can explain the statement that there is another source other 
than emotions to provide motivation. The “ought” in the scenario can be 
understood as a second-order emotion. It is true that you feel annoyed by the noise 
brought by the worker, but you are motivated not to unleash the feeling of being 
annoyed because you have another negative emotion towards your emotion of 
being annoyed. Such second emotion can explain away the appearance of another 
source of motivation. Please note that I do not adopt Prinz’s understanding entirely 
because the appropriateness of emotions should be analyzed in terms of reasons of 
the right kind. 
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 Even if I cannot deny that there is a source other than emotions which 
provide us moral motivation to act, the motivational importance of emotion can still 
be preserved in a weaker sense. If one suffers from ego depletion, then one’s 
reason cannot function effectively and efficiently, which means it is difficult for 
one’s reason to deliberate and motivate one to act morally. But if one encounters 
ego depletion, one will be switched to system 1 even one is not willing to. 
Emotional processes are processes under system 1, which means that one can still 
be morally motivated by emotion in the condition of ego depletion. Moreover, 
system 1 is activated most of the time in one’s daily life, whereas one only engages 
in system 2 and thus are motivated by reason occasionally. Emotions play the 




2 The Bodily Attitudinal Theory of Emotions 
In order to preserve the importance of emotions after introducing neo-
sentimentalism, I suggest that there are three kinds of importance. The first kind is 
that emotions are a more cognitive-economical way to make moral evaluations. The 
second kind is that emotions make one sensitive to the values of the objects in 
environments. And the third kind is that emotions motivate one to act morally. I 
have articulated the first kind in section 1.4, and I shall explain the second and third 
kinds in this section. 
In the previous section, I described neo-sentimentalism, a theory which 
holds that to judge that it is morally wrong to perform an action is to judge that it is 
appropriate to have a particular kind of negative emotion towards the action. These 
negative emotions include at least contempt, anger, and disgust.  
According to Rozin et al. (1999, 576; Prinz and Nichols, 2010, 122), there are 
three different kinds of norms that correspond to these negative emotions, and 
which exist across many different cultures. These are community norms, autonomy 
norms, and divinity norms. Community norms are about public goods and social 
hierarchies. Autonomy norms prohibit harms against people. Divinity norms in non-
secular societies forbid crimes against gods, whereas in secular societies forbid 
crimes against nature. The violation of community norms causes contempt, the 
violation of the autonomy norms brings anger, and the violation of the divinity 
norms spurs disgust. This model is called “the CAD model” (contempt, anger, 
disgust). I will use this model in my thesis. 
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I have analyzed moral judgments in terms of judgments of appropriate 
emotional responses, and the notion of appropriateness is further analyzed in terms 
of the right kinds of reasons for the attitude. What is still needed is a theory of the 
emotions. I will argue that Deonna and Teroni’s bodily attitudinal theory of 
emotions provides us with an explanation of how moral judgments are motivating, 
and it can be used to give an explanation of how emotions and value judgments can 
be justified. Combining the bodily attitudinal theory with neo-sentimentalism, we 
can explain how moral judgments can be warranted.  
2.1 The Central Thesis of the Bodily Attitudinal Theory of Emotions 
The central thesis of the bodily attitudinal theory of emotions is as follows: 
Each emotion consists in a specific felt bodily stance towards objects or 
situations, which is correct or incorrect as a function of whether or not these 
objects and situations exemplify the relevant evaluative property. (Deonna 
and Teroni, 2012, 89)  
 
While having an emotion, we experience a consciously felt physiological reaction 
towards an object. A consciously felt physiological response could make sense or 
not. It makes sense to have the physiological response if the object that the 
physiological reaction is directed at possesses the relevant value; otherwise, it does 
not make sense. According to Smith (2014, 98), the bodily attitudinal theory is 
composed of the following two claims: the first claim is that conscious physiological 
reactions are necessary emotions. The second claim is that to have an emotional 
attitude (a consciously felt physiological response) towards an object is to evaluate 
the object, in the sense that values determine whether it makes sense to have the 
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attitude towards the object. I shall explain each of these claims in more detail in the 
following sections. 
2.1.1. Emotions as Felt Bodily Attitudes 
Conscious physiological reactions include what the psychologist Nico Frijda 
calls action readiness, as well as changes in facial expressions and internal bodily 
systems. The following is how Deonna and Teroni describe conscious physical 
reactions: 
We should conceive of emotions as distinct types of bodily awareness, 
where the subject experiences her body holistically as taking an attitude 
towards a certain object. (Deonna and Teroni, 2012, 79) 
 
Since the consciously felt physiological reaction consists of action readiness and the 
changes of facial expressions and internal bodily system, that is why a conscious ly 
felt physiological response is holistic.  Action readiness is the conscious experience 
that one feels one’s body as ready to take a particular kind of behavior. As Frijda 
(1988, 351) writes, “subjects report impulses to approach or avoid, desires to shout 
and sing or move, and the urge to retaliate, or on occasion, they report an absence 
of desires to do anything or a lack of interest, or feeling of loss of control.” This 
observation provides the basis for the idea that action readiness at least partly 
constitutes emotions. While experiencing anger, one consciously feels one’s body as 
ready to retaliate. While experiencing fear, one consciously experiences one’s body 
as poised to escape from or eliminate the threat. While experiencing shame, one 




Furthermore, Frijda (1988, 351) suggests that different kinds of action 
readiness can clearly differentiate distinct kinds of emotions. For instance, to have 
joy is to feel one’s body as ready to cheer and approach an object; to be angry is to 
feel one’s body as poised to remove or harm the object; to have shame is to have 
feel one’s body as prepared to hide or cover ourselves.  
Note that it is not the case that having an emotion is always having an 
interaction with an object directly. As Frijda writes: 
Joy, for instance, is a sense of pleasure plus the urge toward exuberance and 
contact-seeking. Anger is a sense of displeasure plus the urge to do some of 
the things that remove or harm its agent. Shame is a sense of displeasure 
plus the compelling desire to disappear from view. Sadness is a sense of 
displeasure plus the ebbing away of any urge except for the desire for the 
lost object or opportunity, which is known to be unfulfillable. Frijda (1988, 
351) 
Sometimes while experiencing an emotion, action readiness can be manifested in a 
way without having direct interaction with the object or event. For instance, while 
experiencing joy, I can celebrate because of an object, but my celebration can be 
manifested in a way without contacting the object directly, such as going to a bar 
for a drink with my friends.  
It needs to be clarified that if one has a consciously felt physiological 
reaction, then one feels one’s body as ready to do something, but not vice versa. 
We can feel our bodies as poised to harm or remove an object or engage in an 
event without anger, and we can feel our bodies as prepared to hide while playing 
hide-and-go-seek with my sister without shame. Action readiness is part of a 
physiological reaction but is not a sufficient condition for having a physiological 
response which are necessary to an emotion.  
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Different physiological responses may sometimes overlap, which means that 
the reaction may share the same kind of action readiness. For example, while 
experiencing intense anger and sadness, it is likely the case that one feels one's 
body as ready to get rid of the object that spurs one’s emotions. But it does not 
mean that anger and sadness are the same emotion because the readiness to take a 
particular kind of action is merely a part of the physiological reaction. An emotion as 
a consciously felt physiological response is more than the readiness to perform a 
particular type of behavior. Although physiological response consists of action 
readiness, it also includes the changes of facial expressions (Frijda, 1988, 351). And 
as Deonna (2014, PowerPoint) mentions, a physiological reaction also consists of 
the changes in the autonomic nervous system and endocrine system. In other 
words, an emotion as a complete physiological response consists of action 
readiness and the changes of facial expressions, the autonomic nervous system, and 
endocrine system. Sadness and anger can be differentiated because they are 
distinct as a holistic consciously felt physiological reaction.  
Some might object that we can experience emotion without action 
readiness, which means that action readiness is not a necessary condition for 
emotions. For example, one can fear a dog without being disposed to escape from 
or eliminate the dog. This objection can be explained away, however. If one has an 
emotion without exhibiting a particular kind of action readiness, the problem could 
lie in one’s knowledge rather than action readiness. That is to say that one lacks the 
knowledge of how to respond to a particular kind of objects or events. Thus one 
cannot exhibit a particular kind of action readiness. As Frijda (1988, 351) mentions, 
it can be the case that our body is ready for action without knowing which action. 
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Instead, if one has the knowledge of how to respond to a particular kind of object or 
event, then while experiencing an emotion, one will possess the corresponding 
action readiness. Imagine a child who has never been taught how to deal with an 
aggressive dog. If unfortunately, the child is facing a dog, she cannot exhibit the 
corresponding action readiness because she has never been taught how to escape 
from or eliminate the dog. If she knows how to do so, she will have the disposition 
to escape from or even eradicate the dog as a threat.  
Since the bodily attitudinal theory holds that emotions are consciously felt 
bodily attitude, the second kind of importance of emotions, namely, how to make 
us sensitive to the values of objects and thus make implicit value evaluations. 
Although one might not be able to access to why properties other than values give 
us a reason to have emotions towards objects, given the environments in question 
are so complex, consciously felt bodily attitudes make one aware of the values and 
thus make implicit evaluations. The bodily attitudes make us aware of them simply 
because the attitudes are consciously felt. And such implicit evaluations should be 
understood as behavioral reactions towards the objects. Looking back to the 
firefighter story, he was not able to access to the properties other than 
dangerousness that give him a reason to fear the building since the environment 
was so chaotic and dramatic. Yet he had felt that something was wrong without 
knowing why, and thus commanded his subordinates to leave the building. What he 
firefighter did can be explained by that he had a consciously felt attitude towards 
the building, and thus aware of the dangerousness of the building, then he made an 
implicit evaluation, namely, leaving the building.  
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The notion of action readiness is crucial to explain the third kind of 
importance of emotions, namely, how emotions motivate one to act morally. 
Emotions are motivating because they contain particular kinds of action readiness. 
If one judges that it is morally wrong to take an action, then one appropriately has a 
negative emotion towards the behavior, and with actually having the negative 
emotions, one is also motivated to act morally. A negative emotion includes adverse 
action readiness. By “negative” I mean stopping and preventing any further 
interaction or happening related to the object. We usually see anger and sadness as 
negative emotions. If one experiences anger, then one feels one’s body as ready to 
retaliate, and retaliation prevents the further provocation given by the related 
object. If one experiences sadness, then one feels one’s body as poised to evade the 
object, and evading stop one’s interaction with the happening. Putting all  the things 
together, if one judges that it is morally wrong to take an action, then one 
appropriately has a negative emotion towards the behavior, and with actually 
having the negative emotion, which means one has the behavioral disposition to 
cease and prevent any further interaction or happening related to the behavior.  
In summary, the bodily attitudinal theory holds that emotions are 
consciously felt physiological reactions that include action readiness and the 
changes of facial expressions and internal bodily systems. Being ready to take a 
particular kind of behavior does not mean always interacting with an object directly. 
Although having an emotion-constituting physiological reaction entails being 
prepared to perform a particular kind of behavior, being poised to carry out some 
action is insufficient for having a consciously felt physiological response. Some 
emotions share the same readiness to take a particular kind of behavior, but they 
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are different because they have a distinct combination of the changes of facial 
expressions and internal bodily systems. While having a conscious physiological 
reaction, one’s body may exhibit no action readiness since one does not know what 
action to take. If one’s body is ready to take some action and one knows what to do, 
then action readiness is exhibited.  
2.1.2. Attitudes and Evaluation 
Having clarified what it means for emotions to be consciously felt bodily 
attitudes, I shall explain the second claim. The relation between an attitude and its 
content needs to be introduced and explained because the relation is crucial to 
illustrate why we should favor the bodily attitudinal theory over rivals such as the 
judgmental and the perceptual theories of emotions.  
We can start by considering familiar propositional attitudes. These attitudes 
are helpful to illustrate the difference between an attitude and its content. 
Examples of propositional attitudes include believing that snow is white, hoping 
that Mt Rosea is twelve miles high, and so forth (Oppy, n.d., introduction). The 
attitudes, such as believing and hoping, are different from their contents snow is 
white and Mt Rosea is twelve miles high. Attitudes are evaluations of the content, 
which means that to have an attitude towards the content is to evaluate the 
content in a certain way. In the case of belief, when I believe that snow is white, I 
have an attitude believing (considering as true) towards the content snow is white, 
which means that I evaluate the content as true. Similarly, in the case of emotion, 
when I fear the dog, I have an attitude of fear (considering as dangerous) towards 
the content the dog, which means that I evaluate the dog as dangerous. 
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We need to clarify, in what sense beliefs and emotions are evaluations 
towards their contents. In one mistaken understanding, beliefs are evaluations 
because truth is a part of the content. In other words, when I believe that snow is 
white, I have the content that it is true that snow is white. This sense is mistaken 
because the view entails that no creatures would be able to form beliefs without 
the concept of truth. Call this the content view. Instead, beliefs are evaluations in 
the sense that truth is the formal object of belief, a standard that decides whether 
the attitude of believing is correct, but is not a part of the content. The attitude 
believing towards the content snow is white is correct if and only if snow is white. 
Call this the formal object view.  
Similarly, one could hold that emotions are evaluations because values are a 
part of the content. When I fear the dog, I have an emotional attitude towards the 
dog that is an evaluation because dangerousness is a part of the content the dog. 
Instead, on the formal object view, emotions are evaluations because values are the 
formal objects of these emotions, standards that determine whether the attitudes 
are correct. The attitude of fear towards the content the dog is correct if and only if 
the dog is dangerous, but dangerousness is not part of the content of the fear.  
As the difference between the content view and the formal object view has 
been clarified, we need to choose one. I shall explain why we should be in favor of 
the formal object view but not the content view.  
According to the content view, to have emotional attitudes towards 
contents is to evaluate the contents in the sense that values are a part of the 
content. One version of this view holds that we judge that the contents have certain 
 52 
 
values. The judgmental theory holds that value judgments are necessary for having 
emotions, which means that the value judgment is a necessary part of the emotion 
(Deigh, 2010, 25). For instance, the judgment that the dog is dangerous is necessary 
having the fear of the dog. The judgment that the man is offensive is necessary for 
having the anger at the man. An emotion cannot exist without the corresponding 
value judgment. Fear of the dog cannot exist without the judgment of 
dangerousness, and anger at the man cannot exist without the judgment of 
offensiveness. Nonetheless, it does not mean that having a value judgment entails 
having an emotion since it is possible to have a value judgment without an emotion 
unless the emotion and the value judgment are identical. 
A major objection to the judgmental theory is the problem of the 
recalcitrant emotions. Sometimes one has emotions without the corresponding 
value judgments; sometimes one has emotions that are contrary to one’s value 
judgments. It follows that value judgments are neither necessary nor sufficient for 
having emotional responses (D’Arms and Jacobson, 2003, 129). To illustrate, it is 
possible to fear a dog even while one judges that the dog is not dangerous, and one 
can fail to fear what one judges to be dangerous.  
A simple way to defend the judgmental theory is to say that the fearful 
person judges that the dog is dangerous but at the same time judges that the dog is 
not dangerous. In other words, she holds contradictory judgments, and thus 
experiences a recalcitrant emotion. Nonetheless, it is implausible to the claim that 
we have a rebellious emotion because of the conflicting judgments. The defenders 
of the judgmental theory must provide evidence for the claim that we have 
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conflicting judgments while experiencing a rebellious emotion. Otherwise, it is 
merely an ad hoc hypothesis. It is unconvincing to accept ad hoc explanations since 
they weaken the testability of theories, which means that ad hoc hypotheses make 
theories unable to be confirmed or falsified.1 Another further objection towards the 
straight reply is that we usually experience recalcitrant emotions whereas we 
seldom have contradictory judgments, which means that both kinds of states are 
asymmetric in terms of frequency. The judgmental theory, therefore, remains 
unappealing.  
Some scholars, such as Greenspan, offer a modification of the judgmental 
theory, suggesting that emotions are “perceptions” of values (D’Arms and Jacobson, 
2003, 130). To have an emotional attitude is to perceive the content as having a 
particular value. To have the attitude fear towards the content the dog is to 
perceive that the dog is dangerous. This view is called the perceptual theory. Please 
note that it does not mean that when one has an emotional attitude one literally 
perceives the evaluative content. It should be understood as a quasi-perceptual 
state. Quasi-perceptions are similar to visual and audio perceptions like looking at a 
red cube and listening to a banging sound, because both quasi-perceptions and 
perceptions share some similarities such as incorrigibility and having vivid 
phenomenology (Baker, 2014, 1). Since emotions as quasi-perceptions are relatively 
incorrigible, the recalcitrance of emotions is explained. Imagine that one perceives a 
big pink rabbit in front of the door, and everyone says that there is in fact no such 
                                                                 
1
 Suppose an astrophysicist’s theory predicts that there is a planet running around the sun in our solar 
system. Yet, via our finest and most sophisticated telescopes, we observe no planet there. The 
astrophysicist then adds an ad hoc hypothesis to protect her theory: the planet is invisible, so we cannot 
see it via our finest telescopes. The ad hoc hypothesis makes the theory less testable even not testable at 
all. if visual observation were the only possible test. 
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rabbit at all. Then one has a reason for believing that one’s perception of the big 
pink rabbit is an illusion, but the illusion can remain even if one makes a judgment 
that is contradictory to the illusion. 
Still, it is implausible to accept the perceptual theory. According to Baker 
(2014, 5) and Schroeder (2008, 122), perceptual theories of desire roughly are the 
views that to desire something is to quasi-perceive it as good. This kind of accounts 
face an objection: they are incompatible with the fact that infants and animals have 
desires because quasi-perceiving something as good requires the concept of good. 
Applying this objection to the perceptual theory of emotions, the concepts of values 
are needed to have quasi-perceptions of values. Perhaps some argue that infants 
and animals do not need the concepts of values to have perceptions of evaluative 
properties. Although it is acceptable to say that children and animals have simple 
concepts like the concepts of a red cube and a pink rabbit, it seems improper to say 
that they have the concepts of value since they are more complicated than those 
simple concepts. The concepts of values are more complicated in a way that they 
are too abstract for them to handle. The concept of a red cube and a pink rabbit is 
not abstract because infants and animals can know what they are by seeing a red 
cube and a pink rabbit. But the concepts of values such as wrongness are too 
abstract to them. To know what wrongness is, they need to know what harm and 
deception and other actions that we consider as wrong are. 
This problem is welcome news for my project: the perceptual theory is not a 
good partner to neo-sentimentalism because together they face a circularity 
problem. As D’Arms and Jacobson (2003, 127) write, “…the sentiments adduced to 
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explicate moral concepts already involve the very content they are supposed to 
explain.” Neo-sentimentalists attempt to analyze the moral concepts in moral 
judgments in terms of appropriate emotional responses, and the perceptual 
theorists want to explain emotions in terms of quasi-perceptions of evaluative 
properties. But now we need to introduce the concepts of values to have the quasi-
perceptions of values, which mean that the perceptual theorists use something that 
neo-sentimentalists attempt to explain to explain what emotions are. 
In summary, according to the content view, to have emotional attitudes 
towards the content is to evaluate the content in the sense that values are a part of 
the content. In other words, emotions consist of value judgments or quasi-
perceivings. The judgmental theory should be rejected because of the problem of 
recalcitrant emotions. The perceptual theory fares better on this score, but it is 
incompatible with the fact that infants and animals have emotions. This is welcome 
news for sentimentalists about moral judgment, as sentimentalism cannot be 
combined with either of these theories without circularity. 
Does the bodily attitudinal theory face the problem of circularity as well? 
Some might think that the bodily attitudinal theory faces the same problem 
because concepts of values are needed to have consciously felt physiological 
reactions.  I do not believe so. The bodily attitudinal theorists analyze emotional 
attitudes in terms of conscious physiological responses, and having these reactions 
requires no concepts of values; thus, the theory does not exclude the fact that 
infants and animals have emotions. Also, the bodily attitudinal theory does not 
result in circularity when combined with neo-sentimentalism, because the concepts 
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of values are analyzed in terms of appropriate emotional responses, and the 
emotional responses are further analyzed as instances of physiological reactions. 
2.2 Justifying Emotions and Value Judgments 
This is Deonna and Teroni’s account of when emotions are justified: 
An emotion is justified if, and only if, in the situation in which the subject 
finds herself, the properties she is (or seems to be) aware of and on which 
her emotion is based constitute (or would constitute) an exemplification of 
the evaluative property that features in the correctness conditions of the 
emotions she undergoes.  
(Deonna and Teroni, 2012, 97) 
 
My fear of a dog is justified if and only if my fear is (or seems to be) based on my 
awareness that the dog has the relevant non-evaluative properties, such its sharp 
teeth, claws, and impulsive behavior that constitute (or would constitute) 
dangerousness. Introducing the phrase “would constitute” is required because 
whether the non-evaluative properties constituted the values depends on who one 
is and what the situation is. If one is Ironman, then the non-evaluative properties 
probably do not constitute dangerousness since one is wearing a super armor. 
However, if one is just an ordinary person without protection, then the non-
evaluative properties probably constitute dangerousness. The word “would” merely 
means that it is not the case that the non-evaluative properties constitute the 
evaluative properties to all subjects in all circumstances. Seeming roughly means 
that we think something in the way it is default. I shall explain what seeming means 
with phenomena conservativism below. 
 Also, Deonna and Teroni believe that a justified emotion is sufficient to 
justify the corresponding value judgment. If one is (or seems to be) aware of the 
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non-evaluative features possessed by the particular object which constitutes (or 
would constitute) the relevant evaluative property, then one’s emotion is justified. 
With the justified emotion, if one has no reason to reject the seeming, then one is 
also prima facie justified in believing the corresponding value judgment. If one is or 
seems to be aware of that the non-evaluative properties of the dog which would 
constitute dangerousness, then one is justified to have a fear of the dog. And if one 
has no reason to refuse the seeming, then one is prima facie justified to believe that 
the dog is dangerous. The phrase “prima facie” is needed because a seeming is not 
a decisive justification for emotion because the seeming does not exclude other 
possibilities. 
 Huemer’s (2005, 99) phenomenal conservativism can be used to help 
illustrate Deonna and Teroni’s account. According to Huemer (n.d., section, 1a), if it 
seems to subject S that P and there is no reason or evidence against P, then S is to 
some extent justified in believing P. The meaning of the phrase “it seems to subject 
S that P” should be understood broadly. It can mean perceptual, intellectual, 
memorial, introspective appearances. If it appears to be that the sky is blue, and 
there is no reason or evidence against this seeming, then I am justified in believing 
that the sky is blue. Furthermore, an appearance is defeated if the appearance does 
not match reality since the appearance could be hallucinations or false memories 
and so forth. As Huemer writes: 
Appearances sometimes fail to correspond to reality, as in the case of 
illusions, hallucinations, false memories, and mistaken intuitions. Most 
philosophers agree that logically, this could happen across the board – that 
is, the world as a whole could be radically different from the way it appears. 
These observations do not conflict with phenomenal conservatism. 
Phenomenal conservatives do not hold that appearances are an infallible 
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source of information, or even that they are guaranteed to be generally 
reliable. Phenomenal conservatives simply hold that to assume things are 
the way they appear is a rational default position, which one should 
maintain unless and until grounds for doubt (“defeaters”) appear. (Huemer, 
n.d., section 1b) 
 
Applying phenomenal conservativism to Deonna and Teroni’s account, if it seems to 
one that the non-evaluative properties that would constitute the value is present, 
and one has no reason for refusing the seeming, then one is prima facie justified in 
believing the corresponding value judgment. The idea is that the justified emotion 
entails that it seems that a particular object possesses the non-evaluative property 
that would constitute the value.  In other words, a justified emotion is a defeasible 
justification for the value judgment. If an emotion is unjustified, then we have no 
reason to believe that the particular object possesses the non-evaluative properties 
that would constitute the value, then it is also unjustified to believe the value 
judgment. 
2.3 Bodily Attitudes and the Teleological Theory of Representation 
 When experiencing an emotion, one feels the changes of one’s facial 
expression, muscular movements, and the internal bodily systems. For example, 
while experiencing anger, one feels that one’s face and muscles are in tension, the 
increase in one’s heart rate and breathing and so forth. The psychologist William 
James believes that these bodily phenomena are emotions. Moreover, these bodily 
phenomena are not the results of emotions but emotions themselves. As James 
writes: 
My thesis, on the contrary, is that the bodily changes follow directly the 
perception of the exciting fact and that our feeling of the same changes as 
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they occur is the emotion. James (1884, 189) 
 
The meaning of perception here is different from the meaning of quasi-perception 
in the perceptual theory of emotions mentioned previously. In James’s theory, 
perceptions literally mean bodily sensations. To support this theory, James 
introduces a thought-experiment: 
I now proceed to urge the vital point of my whole theory, which is this. If we 
fancy some strong emotion, and then try to abstract from our consciousness 
of it all the feelings of its characteristic bodily symptoms, we find we have 
nothing left behind, no "mind-stuff" out of which the emotion can be 
constituted, and that a cold and neutral state of intellectual perception is all 
that remains. (James, 1884, 189) 
 
James’s theory has one selling point, that is, the theory is not cognitively demanding 
and thus, unlike the judgmental and perceptual approaches, it does not exclude the 
fact that infants and animals have emotions (Deonna and Teroni, 2012, 64). 
However, the theory has a serious flaw which is that it fails to explain the 
intentionality of emotions. Understanding emotions only as the changes of the 
bodily perceptions is incompatible with our daily speaking of emotions, such as “I 
am angry at John” and “She is sad because the cat is dead.” Emotions must be 
about something, and the theory does not mention the link between emotions and 
the objects that they are directed at.  
The bodily attitudinal theory, however, preserves the intentionality of 
emotions, as its central thesis is that every emotion consists of a consciously felt 
physiological reaction that is directed at an object or event. But what makes the 
conscious physiological responses directed at something? We need a theory of 
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intentionality to illustrate the link between emotions and the objects that they are 
directed at in the bodily attitudinal theory.  
We believe that our mental states represent something in the world. But 
why are they about something? What is the representational relation between the 
mental states and the world (Peters, 2014, 273; Millikan, 2003, 3)? Applying the 
question to the intentionality of bodily attitudes, why are they directed at contents 
or objects? What determines bodily attitudes directed at contents or objects? We 
need to introduce to a theory of representation as a complete theory of emotions is 
required to explain the intentionality of emotions. A plausible theory of 
representation is the teleological theory of mental content. This theory holds that a 
mental state represents something because of its biological function to indicate the 
object in question. I believe that this approach is suitable for explaining the 
intentionality of the emotions, since some believe that emotions are evolutionary 
products (Johnson, n.d., section 2), and the teleological theory also explains the 
representation of mental states in terms of evolution.  
 The teleological theory of mental content holds that a mental state in a 
creature represents an object if and only if the mental state is biologically selected 
to perform the function of detecting the object (Peters, 2014, 274).  The concept of 
the dog represents dogs because the concept has the biologically selected function 
indicate dogs. It is just like that a thermometer represents the temperature because 
it has the designed function of detecting the temperature. The biological function of 
indicating dogs exists because the concept was selected to detect dogs and develop 
advantageous behavior for responding to dogs. Evolution shapes the selection over 
 61 
 
a period, or by learning or conditioning during the lifetime of a creature. Applying 
this theory to bodily attitudes, such attitudes are directed at their contents or 
objects because they have their biological functions of indicating the content or 
objects, and evolution or learning shape the biological functions. Evolution develops 
our bodily attitudes so we are more likely to survive in hazardous environments and 
more social in cultivation. And to develop bodily attitudes by learning is helpful to 
achieve particular purposes. For instance, a boxer needs to learn to be angry at his 
opponent to win the competition. 
 The teleological theory is an “externalist” theory, which means the mental 
content is not determined by anything such as memory and seeming, in one’s mind 
consciously, but determined by what one encountered in the past. As Millikan 
writes: 
Thus naturalistic teleological theories are "externalist" theories of mental 
content. They imply that the content of one's thought is not determined by 
anything before one's mind or within one's consciousness or even within 
one's head. Just as actually remembering something, rather than merely 
seeming to remember it, does not happen wholly within one's present head 
but requires that one has previously encountered that thing, thoughts that 
are about something actual also require the right sort of history. It would be 
possible for a teleologist to avoid this externalism only with a non-historical 
and also non-environment-relative account of the nature of biological 
functions. (Millikan, 2003, 5) 
 
A major objection towards the teleological theory of mental content is the swamp-
man objection. If the teleological theory is true, then the representation of a mental 
state in a creature is determined by its biological function, which is selected for by 
evolution, learning or conditioning. However, we can imagine that the mental states 
in a creature represent something, yet their functions are not determined by 
evolutionary selection or learning (Peters, 2014, 275). Davidson (1987, 443) 
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mentions the following thought-experiment: suppose that Davidson is walking 
nearby a swamp and suddenly gets stuck by lighting. The lighting totally destroys 
Davidson, meanwhile coincidentally the materials from the swamp perfectly 
reassemble into a replica of Davidson at the molecular level. The replica of Davidson 
is behaviorally identical with Davidson, which means that the replica talks, walks, 
and writes like Davidson. Since the replica is made of the materials of the swamp, 
he is called “the swamp-man.” We tend to think that the mental states of the 
swamp-man are representational. But the mental states were not selected for, nor 
are they the result of learning.  
 There are two responses to the swamp-man objection. Some teleological 
theorists deny that the swamp-man has representational states (Neander, 2006, 
385; Millikan 1996, 7). Other teleological theorists deny that the swamp-man is 
insufficient to falsify the teleological theory because the swamp-man is not a 
creature in reality since the teleological theory is only about real creatures (Peters, 
2014, 276).  
 To explain why bodily attitudes are directed at objects or contents, and why 
fear is directed at the dog, the teleological theory is a possible move. Bodily 
attitudes are directed at their objects or content because they have their biological 
function of detecting the objects and contents, and their selection history designs 
the function to develop appropriate evolutionary behavior for the species’ 
flourishment. Perhaps, more specifically, emotions are biologically designed in 
order to promote pro-social behavior in civilized societies (Prinz, 2007, 80).  
2.4 Objections towards the Bodily Attitudinal Theory of Emotions 
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2.4.1 Joel Smith’s First Objection and Reply 
Since the bodily attitudinal theory holds that consciously felt physiological 
reactions are necessary for having emotions, the proponents of the theory need to 
explain why there are some patients who have a rich emotional life, although 
lacking the abilities to feel bodily sensations and perform muscular movements 
(Smith, 2014, 101). A contemporary bodily theorist of emotions, Damasio (2006, 
155), suggests that there is a device called “as-if loop” within the brain This device 
simulates the changes in the bodily feelings in cases which veridical bodily feelings 
are no longer available.  
We can reasonably assume that the “as-if loop” device is Deonna and 
Teroni’s default defense. Nevertheless, it seems that the “as -if loop” device cannot 
help defend the bodily attitudinal theory because Deonna and Teroni claim that 
emotions are essentially felt, yet Damasio explicitly refers to the three following 
states: 
A state of emotion, which can be triggered and executed unconsciously; a 
state of feeling which can be represented non-consciously; and a state of 
feeling made conscious, i.e. known to the organism having both emotions 
and feelings. (Damasio, 2000, 37) 
 
Since Deonna and Teroni claim that emotions are essentially felt and the “as -if loop” 
device simulates bodily feelings unconsciously, it is unclear how they could use the 
device as a reply to this objection, and thus they accept both of the following 
statements, which creates a tension without a solution (Smith, 2014, 102): 
(a) Conscious emotion can persist in patients without any bodily feeling, 
veridical or otherwise.  
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(b) Emotional phenomena are bodily phenomena. 
To reply to this objection, I will reject (a) and preserve (b). I believe that besides the 
“as-if” device phantom limbs sensation and phantom pain open another possibility 
for the bodily attitudinal theory.  
Phantom limb sensations are common phenomena among a variety of 
individuals (Giummarra et al., 2007, 220). At least 98% of the patients experience 
phantom limbs after amputation, nerve damage, or spinal cord damage, and 
approximately one-fifth of children with inborn limb aplasia experience the 
phantoms as well. 80% of patients who had a limb removed reported that they 
experienced various kinds of phantom pain, including burning, tingling, throbbing 
and so forth. Some patients report that they have phantom sensations immediately 
after amputation, whereas some report that the sensations emerge years later. 
Phantom sensations may be the sensations of limbs such as arms, legs, breasts, and 
even internal organs. Phantom limbs are described as occupying space, which 
means that it feels like they have sizes, sharps, and postures, and patients claim 
that they can control the phantom limbs. 
Phantom limbs sensations can be perceived normally or abnormally 
(Giummarra et al., 2007, 221). Some patients report that they can move their 
phantom limbs within a limited range whereas some claim that they can move the 
limbs to anatomically impossible positions. Patients who suffered from spinal cord 
damage tell that they perceive phantom limbs sensation in their lower body 
unrealistically, such as feeling “like the toes are all turned down under the bottom 
of the foot.” 
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 In the past, it was speculated that phantom limbs sensations are caused by 
the neuromas at the tip of stumps. However, this theory is insufficient to explain 
the sensations, since people who suffer from inherent limb deficiency sometimes 
feel phantom limbs as well. This suggests that there is a central representation of 
the limbs in the brain (Ramachandran and Hirstein, 1998, 1604). 
 Another theory, which explains the central representation, is called “the 
neuro-matrix theory” (Giummarra et al., 2007, 224). This theory holds that the 
attentions and the perceptions of the body are caused by configured activities 
based on the neuro-signatures inside of the brain. Neuro-signatures can be 
generated by a variety of causes, such as somatic inputs, visual inputs, and even the 
changes of the immune system. Although the neuro-matrix created by different 
inputs, the removal of limbs and the losses of other kinds of biological inputs can 
lead to a cortical reorganization, and the outburst of the activities of the neuro-
matrix produce configured activities similar to the activity associated with pain and 
eventually cause conscious phantom pain. Whilst the neuro-matrix theory can 
explain that some phantom pain is caused by sources other than injury, lesion and 
the losses of limbs, the theory is difficult to test empirically (Giummarra et al., 2007, 
224). The theory is unable to explain why phantom limb pain cannot be weakened 
by the disappearance and the spontaneous termination of phantom limb sensation, 
and why some patients do not feel phantom limb pain after amputation (Bittar et al., 
2005, 401). 
 Although the fact that there is not yet a satisfactory theory which explains 
the nature of phantom limb pain and phantom limb sensations, these phantom 
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states are wide-spread phenomena. It is possible that patients with spinal damage 
experience “phantom emotions.” By “phantom emotions” I mean that while those 
patients are reporting that they experience conscious emotions, they may be 
feeling the changes of the phantom sensations of their internal organs and the 
muscular movement that are longer physically linked to their brain. Given the 
majority of amputees and people who suffer from congenital limb deficiency 
experience phantom limb pain and phantom limb sensation, “phantom emotions” 
could well be a usual phenomenon. Thus, we can preserve the central thesis of (BAT) 
while explaining those patients with complete spinal cord damage. However, I have 
to make it clear that this is only a possibility because such speculation is not 
empirically verified and further investigation on the relations between phantom 
limb sensations and “phantom emotions” is needed.  
 
2.4.2 Joel Smith’s Second Objection and Reply 
This second objection is about the correctness condition in the bodily 
attitudinal theory. Deonna and Teroni’s account of the correctness condition is as 
follows: 
Fear of the dog is an experience of the dog as dangerous because it consists 
in feeling the body’s readiness to act so as to diminish the dog’s likely impact 
on it (flight, preemptive attack, etc.), and this felt attitude is correct if and 
only if the dog is dangerous. (Deonna and Teroni, 2012, 81) 
 
While it is natural to say that it is correct to run if and only if the dog is dangerous, 
the meaning of correctness needs to be clarified further. What is meant by “correct” 
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in this context? Surely being correct cannot mean being true because action 
readiness cannot be true or false. 
The following examples provided by Deonna and Teroni themselves vividly 
illustrate the seriousness of this problem: anger is the experience that one feels that 
one’s body is ready to retaliate, and this anger is correct if and only if another 
person is offensive to one. But Jesus disagrees with such a saying as it is written in 
the Bible: if anyone strikes you on the right cheek, turn the other so (Matthew 5:39). 
It seems that you ought to agree with Jesus if you are a Christian.  
Another way to clarify the meaning of correctness is to say that being 
correct means being rational, yet this can also be questioned: is it rational to 
execute retaliation if a person is offensive to you? In the spirit of G.E. Moore, if 
being correct is synonymous with being rational in this context, then we would not 
say no to the above question since it would be self-contradictory. Smith (2014, 104), 
as Deonna and Teroni (2012, 7) mention, suggests that the seriousness of this 
problem lies in differentiating emotional appropriateness, prudential  
appropriateness, and moral appropriateness.  
 I have already replied to this objection before in section 1. Since I propose 
that being correct means being appropriate to have an emotion, which means that 
one has a right reason to have the emotion, I shall not investigate this objection 
further. I wonder why this section is even necessary given that it goes nowhere and 
ends up depending on what was said in section 1. 
2.4.3 Joel Smith’s Third Objection and Reply 
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The third objection is that it is unclear how the awareness of the non-
evaluative content in one’s cognitive base justifies the corresponding evaluative 
attitude (Smith, 2014, 104). It is difficult to tell how the awareness of the impulsive 
behavior, the shape of the teeth, and claws possessed by a dog justifies the fear of 
the dog. Unless we have further information that a particular kind of non-evaluative 
properties is identified with a particular kind of evaluative property, it is implausible 
to think that the justification for emotions can travel via the content. 
 The straightest way of replying to this objection is to claim that a particular 
kind of non-evaluative property is identical with a particular kind of evaluative 
property, and thus, the non-evaluative content can justify the evaluative attitude. 
However, I shall argue that the identity relation cannot be proven empirically 
because the inference to the best explanation can prove the claim that water is H2O 
whereas we cannot prove the claim that the non-evaluative properties are identical 
with the evaluative properties. The claim that water is H2O can be proven by the 
inference to the best explanation because the claim possesses some explanatory 
power. Here is an observable fact: 
If we submit a sample of water to electrolysis, then hydrogen will be formed 
at the cathode and bubbles of oxygen will form at the anode. The mass of 
water decreases by the same amount that the mass of hydrogen and oxygen 
increase. Two moles of hydrogen are formed for every one mole of oxygen. 
(Huemer, 2005, 89) 
 
Base on the observable fact, we can make the scientific hypothesis that water is 
H2O because the hypothesis causally and counter-factually explains the observable 
fact. The causal explanation is that water is constituted by hydrogen and oxygen, 
and it is the only causal explanation to the fact. The counter-factual explanation is 
 69 
 
that the fact would not happen if water were not identical with H2O, and no other 
counter-factual explanation can explain the fact equally well.  
 However, the claim the non-evaluative properties are identical with 
evaluative properties cannot be proven by the inference to the best explanation. 
Assume that John kills many people, and we make the moral hypothesis that John is 
immoral. The moral hypothesis possesses no explanatory power since it cannot 
causally or counter-factually explain why John kills many people. The moral 
hypothesis cannot causally explain that because we can explain that John kills many 
people without using any moral terms (Huemer, 2005, 90). The moral hypothesis 
cannot counter-factually explain the fact because we can explain the fact equally 
well with a psychological story (Huemer, 2005, 90). For instance, a psychologist can 
say that if John’s parents had not neglected him, then he would not have killed 
anyone.  
 Another less ambitious strategy is to claim that the particular kind of 
evaluative properties supervenes on the particular kind of non-evaluative 
properties, which means that if the non-evaluative properties change, then the 
evaluative properties change. Although the evaluative properties supervene on the 
non-evaluative properties, they are not identical with each other. The evaluative 
properties supervene on the non-evaluative properties because the non-evaluative 
properties exhaustively constitute the evaluative properties (Shafer-Laudan, 2003, 
76). Imagine there is a lead statue. The piece of lead exhaustively constitutes the 
statute, yet they are not identical with each other since the piece of lead would 
remain even if the statute is destroyed. Since the non-evaluative properties 
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exhaustively constitute the evaluative properties, the non-evaluative properties can 
justify the evaluative attitudes. 
 Even if the supervenience strategy is also untenable, there is still a way of 
defending the justificatory account of the bodily attitudinal theory. It is unnecessary 
to justify the evaluative attitude via the awareness of the non-evaluative content, 
which means that one can bypass such awareness to justify the attitude. Deonna 
and Teroni seem to assume epistemic internalism in this picture, yet I think that 
epistemic externalism opens another possibility to justify the attitude. Briefly, 
epistemic internalism requires that one is able to cognitively get access to the 
justification for beliefs, whereas epistemic externalism holds that one does not 
need to cognitively get access to the justification, and allows the justification to be 
grounded outside one's cognition (Bonjour, 2002, 234; Poston, n.d., introduction). 
 An argument against epistemic internalism and for externalism is that 
unsophisticated epistemic subjects cannot have internalist justification (Bonjour, 
2002, 242). These subjects include higher animals, young children, and cognitively 
unsophisticated adults. Higher animals can understand a wide variation of 
commands, to have desires, emotions, and even beliefs, it is unclear that they are 
sophisticated enough to have reasons for their beliefs. If an argument is markedly 
complicated, requiring one to divide the argument into many parts and know a lot 
of technical terms, then young children and some elderly people cannot cognitively 
understand the argument and thus have internalist justification. Furthermore, the 
chicken-sexers are experts who are capable of distinguishing between male and 
female chickens. It is reported they are unable to describe how to do the distinction, 
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yet they can sort chickens and believe that this is a male and this is a female. Since 
we tend to think that higher animals, young children, elder people and chicken-
sexers have knowledge to a certain extent, it is either the case that knowledge does 
not require justification or that justification is not internal (Poston, n.d., section 3b). 
If there are cases that people have knowledge without internal justification, then 
analogously it seems plausible to believe that one can be justified to have the 
evaluative attitudes without internal awareness of the non-evaluative content in 
one’s cognitive base. 
 One famous version of externalism is Goldman’s Process reliabilism. This 
theory holds that a belief is justified if and only if the belief is formed by a reliable 
belief-making process (Goldman, 1979, 97). A belief-making process is a process 
that takes certain inputs such as visual experience and transforms them into certain 
outputs such as beliefs. A reliable belief-making process is a process that tends to 
produce true beliefs. Perceptions and memory are reliable belief-forming processes 
because they tend to produce true beliefs in most of the cases that they are applied, 
whereas guessing and wishful thinking are unreliable processes because they tend 
to produce false beliefs in most of the cases. By “tend” it means that justification is 
a matter of degree. The more reliable a belief-making process is, the more justified 
the belief produced by the process is. If I clearly remember that I ate noodles this 
morning, then my belief that I ate noodles this morning is more justified, whereas if 
I fuzzily remember that, then my belief is less justified. 
 Nevertheless, a reliable belief-forming process is neither sufficient nor 
necessary for justifying a belief (Greco, 2002, 292). Suppose John has a rare sort of 
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brain lesion which causes him to produce the belief that he has a brain lesion. 
However, he has no evidence for it, and even has evidence against it, because he 
has been given a medical analysis that claims that he is perfectly healthy by 
qualified neurologists. We tend to think that his brain lesion is a reliable way to 
form the belief, yet we do not think that he is justified to have the belief. This 
demonstrates a reliable belief-forming process is not sufficient for justifying beliefs. 
Assume that John is in a world full of massive deception created by a mighty demon. 
In this world, everything is exactly the same as in the actual world. John can form 
his beliefs by different processes like perceptions and memory. But we do not think 
that he forms these beliefs reliably because of the massive deception, yet we tend 
to think that he is justified to have the beliefs. Thus, a reliable belief-forming 
process is not necessary for justifying beliefs.  
 To avoid the brain lesion case and the mighty demon case, we can adapt 
Agent Reliabilism. This theory holds that a belief is B-justified (being justified for 
beliefs) if and only if the belief is a product of one’s intellectual virtues  as B-reliable 
processes (processes that tend to produce true beliefs). There are at least two 
understandings of intellectual virtues. Sosa understands intellectual virtues as 
cognitive abilities such as perception, memory, and introspection, whereas 
Montmarquet understands these virtues as personal traits such as intellectual 
courage and intellectual carefulness (Greco, 2002, 293). Agent reliabilism is able to 
explain the counter-examples to Goldman’s reliabilism. In the brain lesion case, the 
belief caused by brain lesion is B-unjustified because it is not the outcome of one’s 
intellectual virtues as B-reliable processes. In the mighty demon case, although one 
is being massively deceived, one is B-justified to have the beliefs because they are 
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the products of one’s intellectual virtues  as B-reliable processes. A belief is B-
justified because the belief is the product of one’s intellectual virtue as B-reliable 
processes. And one’s intellectual virtue as a reliable belief-forming process likely 
produces true beliefs. Analogously, if an emotion is formed via one’s intellectual 
virtue as E-reliable processes (processes that tend to produce correct emotions), 
then the emotion is E-justified (being justified for emotions) since the intellectual 
virtue as reliable emotion-forming processes tend to produce emotions which are 
likely correct. If we have no reason for questioning the E-reliability of the emotion-
forming process, then the correspondent value judgment is B-justified as well. 
 A reason for justifying emotions in this way is that agent reliabilism can 
explain the accountability of having emotions. We can hold people accountable for 
having certain emotions (Prinz, 2007, 115). If one forms an emotion based on 
unreliable emotion-making processes, we say that one’s emotion is not justified and 
one is accountable for having the emotion. Instead, if one forms an emotion based 
on one’s cognitive abilities like perceptions, we say that one’s emotion is E-justified 
and one is praiseworthy for having the emotion. In this context, emotion-making 
processes should be understood as cognitive abilities like perceptions but not 
personal characteristics like carefulness since for example, it seems that carefulness 
entails that one is making an emotion under the processes of system 2. In other 
words, one is making an emotion under some kind of intentional control, and thus 
my view is contradictory. 
2.5 Moral emotions and Non-Moral Emotions 
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Suppose two boxers are fighting against each other in a boxing competition. 
Both of the boxers are angry at each other indeed, but they do not think that the 
other is acting morally wrong. From this example, we can tell there is a distinction 
between moral anger and non-moral anger, or in generally, there is a distinction 
between moral emotions and non-moral emotions. This distinction is important for 
justifying moral judgments as the boxing example tells that non-moral anger can be 
appropriate even if it would not make sense to judge the target of such anger to be 
morally wrong. The non-moral anger can justify the judgment that the person is 
offensive. But being offensive is not always being morally wrong. Instead, we can 
legitimately and naturally claim that the moral anger justifies the judgment that the 
person is morally condemnable. To justify the judgment of wrongness, the anger 
must be a moral anger. What makes an anger a moral anger? 
The answer is ready to hand. As mentioned above, in the CAD model there 
are three different sorts of emotions, including, contempt, anger, and disgust. The 
violation of community norms causes contempt, the violation of autonomy norms 
arises anger, and the violation of divinity norms in secular societies spurs disgust. 
These norms not only can differentiate different kinds of negative emotions, and 
are also able to distinguish moral emotions and non-moral emotions. The contempt 
of the weakness of will in physical exercise is not a moral contempt because the 
contempt is not directed at the violation of community norms. The anger at another 
boxer is not a moral anger because the anger is not directed at the violation of 
autonomy norms. The disgust directed at excrement is not a moral disgust because 
the disgust is not direct at the violation of divinity norms. A negative emotion is a 
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moral negative emotion if and only if the negative emotion is directed at the 
violation of the norms in the CAD model.  
Then the following question is: what makes the norms in the CAD model 
moral norms? A simple answer is that moral emotions make the norms moral norms. 
Another question is: what makes the emotions moral emotions? Another simple 
answer is that the moral norms make the emotions moral emotions. The 
mechanism is as follows: 
Imagine that certain behaviors cause emotions that are not yet specific to 
the moral domain. An act of cruelty might cause anger on the part of the 
victim, and sympathy among others. The perpetrator may be ostracized, 
criticized, and punished. This may cause the perpetrator to feel sad. If these 
responses are stable, then cruelty is governed by a kind of rule. The rule 
consists in the fact that cruelty is discouraged as a result of these emotional 
responses. The emotions guarantee a predictable pattern of behavior. 
Cruelty is less likely to occur, and when it does, certain emotions and 
corresponding behaviors will follow. After this pattern is established, the 
emotions that once had no moral significance take on new meaning. 
Sadness is not just a generic loss-response, but a feeling associated with 
violating a rule. Anger is not a generic response to a threat, but a feeling 
directed at rule violators. Guilt and righteous anger are born. At the very 
moment these emotions are born, the rule takes on new meaning. It is now 
a rule enforced by moral emotions. It is a moral rule. (Prinz, 2007, 118) 
 
Some might worry that the creation of moral norms and moral emotions would be 
an example of vicious circularity (Prinz, 2007, 118). But I do not think that It is not a 
vicious circularity because this circularity is different the circularities we deem 
vicious. If we cannot explain A by B and then explain B by A because we believe that 
there is an ultimate explanation for the case. We think that there must be an 
explanation before other explanations. But we do not need to believe that there is a 
priority between moral norms and moral emotions. It is not either the case that 
moral norms precede moral emotions or that moral emotions precede moral norms 
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because they mutually depend on each other. We do not ask which organ in our 
body is more fundamental because the organs mutually rely on each other to keep 
the body alive. The heart has the function of pumping blood, the liver has the role 
of neutralizing toxins, the stomach has the function of digesting food, and so forth. 
When all the organs are placed together, they have a new task: keeping the body 
alive. The same goes for moral norms and moral emotions. Negative emotions have 
the functions of preventing a certain kind of behavior, and the norms the functions 
of guiding people to have a particular kind of negative emotions towards a certain 
kind of behavior. When the norms and the negative emotions are placed together, 
they have a new function: preventing people from violating the norms. 
 
3 Concluding Remarks: Putting Things Together 
Historically, sentimentalists understood moral judgments as the expressions 
of sentiments towards actions, but such understanding leads us to the problem of 
the recalcitrance of emotions. To avoid this difficulty, neo-sentimentalists 
understand moral judgment as the judgments of an appropriate emotion without 
actually having the emotion. The notion of being appropriate is analyzed in terms of 
reasons of the right kind. At this point, neo-sentimentalists unify reason and 
emotions in their framework. Meanwhile, in order to preserve the importance of 
emotions, it is argued that emotions are a more cognitively economical way to 
make moral evaluations. Emotions also make one sensitive to the values of the 
objects in environments and motivate one to act morally.  
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The bodily attitudinal theory of emotions illustrates how emotions bring one 
the sensitivity and moral motivation. Emotions are consciously felt physiological 
responses that consist of behavioral dispositions and other bodily phenomena. 
Since bodily attitudes are consciously felt, one is aware of the values of the objects 
in environments. Because emotions have behavioral dispositions, one is motivated 
to act morally while having the emotion, and such dispositions are as well implicit 
evaluations towards objects.  
Neo-sentimentalism holds that to judge that an action is morally wrong is to 
judge that it is appropriate to resent killing, which means that we have a right 
reason to resent killing, without actually having the resentment. However, in order 
to be more morally competent, one also needs the help of emotions to sense moral 





 American Psychological Association (2012). What You Need to Know About 
Willpower: The Psychological Science of Self-control, URN =  
<http://www.apa.org/helpcenter/willpower.aspx>. 
 Baker, D. (2014). The Abductive Case for Humeanism Over Quasi-Perceptual 
Theories of Desire. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 8 (2): 1-29. 
 Beauchamp, T. (1998). David Hume: An Enquiry Concerning the Principles 
of Morals: A Critical Edition. Oxford University Press. 
 Bechara, A., Damasio H, and Damasio A. R. (2000). Emotion, Decision 
Making and the Orbitofrontal Cortex. Cerebral cortex 10.3 (2000): 295-307. 
 Becker, K. (n.d). Reliabilism, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, URN = < 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/reliabil/> 
 Berthoz, S., Armony, J.L., Blair, R. J. R., Dolan, R. J. 2002. An fMRI Study of 
Intentional and Unintentional (embarrassing) Violations of Social Norms. 
Brain 125: 1696–708  
 Birondo, N. (2014). Aristole, Virtue, and the Wrong Kind of Reason. In 
Dimensions of Moral Agency edited by David Boersema. Cambridge Scholars 
Publishing. 
 Bittar, R. G., Otero, S., Carter, H., Aziz, T. Z. (2005). Deep Brain Stimulation 
for Phantom Limb Pain. Journal of Clinical Neuroscience 12 (4): 399–404.  
 Blair, R. J. R. (1995). A Cognitive Developmental Approach to Morality: 
Investigating the Psychopath. Cognition 57: 1–29.  
 Bonjour, L. (2002). Intemalism and Extemalism. In Paul K. Moser 
(ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology. Oxford University Press 234--
263. 
 Damasio, A. R. (2000). The Feeling of What Happens: Body, Emotion and 
the Making of Consciousness. London: Random House.  
 Damasio, A. R. (2006). Descartes Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human 
Brain. London: Random House.  
 D'Arms, J., Jacobson, D (2003). VIII. The Significance of Recalcitrant 
Emotion. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 52: 127-145. 
 D'Arms, J., Jacobson, D. (2000). Sentiment and Value. Ethics 110 (4):722-
748.  
 Davidson, D. (1987). Knowing One's Own Mind. Proceedings and 
Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 60 (3): 441-458. 
 Deigh, J. (2010). Concepts of Emotions in Modern Philosophy and Psychology. 
In Peter Goldie (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. New 
York, Oxford University Press 17-40. 




 Deonna, J. A., Teroni, F. (2012). The Emotions: A Philosophical 
Introduction. Routledge. 
 Finlay, S. (2007). Four Faces of Moral Realism. Philosophy Compass 2 (6): 
820-849. 
 Fisher, A. (2011). Metaethics: An Introduction. Routledge. 
 Frijda, N. (1988). The Laws of Emotions. American Psychologist. 
 79 
 
 Greene, D. (2007). Why are VMPFC Patients More Utilitarian? A Dual-
Process Theory of Moral Judgment Explains. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11 
(8): 322-323. 
 Giummarra, M. J., Gibson, S. J., Georgiou-Karistianis, N., Bradshaw, J. L. 
(2007). Central Mechanisms in Phantom Limb Perception: The Past, Present 
and Future. Brain Research Reviews 54. 
 Goldman, A. (1979). What is Justified Belief? In George Pappas 
(ed.), Justification and Knowledge. Boston: D. Reidel 1-25 (1979). 
 Greco, J. (2002). Virtues in Epistemology. In Paul Moser (ed.), Oxford 
Handbook of Epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press 287--315. 
 Haidt, J., Bjorklund, F., Murphy, S. (2000). Moral dumbfounding: When 
Intuition Finds No Reason. Department of Psychology, Lund University. 
 Hieronymi, P. (2005). The Wrong Kind of Reason. Journal of 
Philosophy 102 (9): 437 - 457. 
 Holton, R. (2009). Willing, Wanting, Waiting. Oxford University Press. 
 Huemer, M. (2005). Ethical Intuitionism. Palgrave Macmillan. 
 Huemer, M. (n.d). Phenomenal Conservativism. Internet Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy 
 James, W. (1884). What is an Emotion? Mind 9 (34):188-205. 
 Johnson, G. (n.d). Theories of Emotions. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
URN = < http://www.iep.utm.edu/emotion/> 
 Klein, G. A. (1998). Sources of Power. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 Koenigs, M., Kruepke, M., Zeier, J., Newman, P. (2011). Utilitarian Moral 
Judgment in Psychopath. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience 7 (6): 
708-714 
 Lang, G. (2008). The Right Kind of Solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason 
Problem. Utilitas 20 (4):472-489. 
 Levy, N. (2010). Resisting “Weakness of the Will.” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 82 (1): 134 - 155. 
 McMillen, D. L., and Austin, J. B. (1971). Effect of Positive Feedback on 
Compliance Following Transgression. Psychonomic Science, 24: 59–61.  
 Millikan, R. G. (2003). Teleological Theories of Mental Content. Encyclopedia 
of Cognitive Science, Vol. 11; Macmillan 2003, pp. 1138-1141. 
 Millikan, R. G. (1996). On Swampkinds. Mind and Language 11 (1):103-17.  
 Moll, J., Oliveirra-Souza, R. De, Eslinger P. J. (2003). Morals and the Human 
Brain: A Working Model. Neuroreport 14: 299–305. 
 Neander, K. (2006). Naturalistic Theories of Reference. In: Michel Devitt and 
Richard Hanley (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Language. 
Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 374-392. 
 Olson, J. (2009). The Wrong Kind of Solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason 
Problem. Utilitas 21 (2):225-232. 
 Oppy, G. (n.d.) Propositional attitudes. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
URN = <https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/propositional-attitudes>. 
 Peters, U. (2014). Teleosemantics, Swampman, and Strong 
Representationalism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 90:273–288. 
 Poston, T. (n.d.) Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology. Internet 
Encyclopeida of Philosophy, URN = <http://www.iep.utm.edu/int-ext/>. 
 Prinz, J.J. (2006). The Emotional Basis of Moral Judgments. Philosophical 
Explorations 9 (1): 29-43. 
 80 
 
 Prinz, J.J. (2015). An Empirical Case for Motivational Internalism. In Gunnar 
Björnsson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder, John Eriksson & Fredrik 
Björklund (eds.), Motivational Internalism. Oxford University Press 61-84. 
 Prinz, J.J. (2007). The Emotional Construction of Morals. Oxford University 
Press. 
 Prinz, J.J.,  Nichols, S. (2010). Moral Emotions. In John Michael Doris 
(ed.), The Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford University Press 111. 
 Rabinowicz W., Rønnow‐Rasmussen, T. (2004). The Strike of the Demon: 
On Fitting Pro‐Attitudes and Value. Ethics 114 (3): 391-423. 
 Ramachandran, V. S., Hirstein, W. (1998). The Perception of Phantom Limbs. 
The D. O. Hebb lecture". Brain: a journal of neurology 121 (9): 1603–1630. 
 Rosati, C. S. (2014). Moral Motivation. The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/moral-motivation/>. 
 Rozin, P., Lowery, L., Imada, S., Haidt, J. (1999). The CAD Triad Hypothesis: 
A Mapping between Three Moral Emotions (contempt, anger, disgust) and 
Three Moral Codes (community, autonomy, divinity). Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology 76: 574–86.  
 Samuelsson, L. (2013). The Right Version of “the Right Kind of Solution to 
the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem.” Utilitas 25 (3):383-404.  
 Sanfey, A. G., Rilling, J. K., Aronson, J. A., Nystrom, L. E., Cohen J. D. 
(2003). The Neural Basis of Economic Decision-making in the Ultimatum 
Game. Science 300: 1755–58.  
 Sauer, H. (2011). The Appropriateness of Emotions: Moral Judgment, Moral 
Emotions, and the Conflation Problem. Ethical Perspectives 18 (1):107-140.  
 Scanlon, T. (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press. 
 Schnall, S., Haidt, J., Clore, G. L., Jordan, A. H. (2008). Disgust as Embodied 
Moral Judgment. Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin, 34(8), 1096–1109.  
 Schroeder, M. (2008). Value and the Right Kind of Reason. 
 Schroeder, M. (2008). How Does the Good Appear to Us? Social Theory 
and Practice 34 (1): 119-130.  
 Shafer-Landau, R. (2003). Moral Realism: A Defence. Oxford University 
Press. 
 Slote, M. (2003). Sentimentalist Virtue and Moral Judgement: Outline of a 
Project. Metaphilosophy 34 (1‐2):131-143. 
 Slote, M. (2010). Moral Sentimentalism. Oxford University Press. 
 Smith, J. (2014). Are Emotions Embodied Evaluative 
Attitudes?  Disputatio 6 (38):93-106. 
 Sripada, C. S. (2010). Philosophical Questions About the Nature of 
Willpower. Philosophy Compass 5 (9):793–805. 
 Watson, L. (2011). Comments on Michael Slote's Moral 
Sentimentalism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1):142-147. 
 Wheatley, T., Haidt, J. (2005). Hypnotically Induced Disgust Makes Moral 
Judgments More Severe. Psychological Science 16: 780–84. 
